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“PLEASE NOTE:  YOU HAVE WAIVED 
EVERYTHING”:  CAN NOTICE REDEEM 
ONLINE CONTRACTS? 
CHERYL B. PRESTON* 
Online consumers are largely unaware of the extent to which their actions 
are governed by legal terms in the form of clickwraps or browsewraps.  These 
contracts are enforced without any evidence of knowing assent to the terms but 
only if the consumer has some notice that a contract exists.  The standards for 
notice are low and consumers routinely click and browse without forming a 
single thought relative to the legal obligations that arise with online conduct—
legal obligations that frequently would not arise with procuring the same goods 
and services in the real world.  Commentators have been scrambling hopelessly 
to propose various schemes for bringing home to consumers the fact that they 
are entering enforceable contracts. 
This Article debunks the idea that notice of the existence of a contract should 
be the measure of enforceability.  The concept of notice relies on the purely 
fictional notion that a reasonable consumer with notice of legal provisions will 
stop, read them, understand the terminology, appreciate their legal 
significance, and decide to proceed or not.  The relish for notice is 
irreconcilable with our knowledge that consumers do not, and cannot, read 
and comprehend even a fraction of the wrap contracts they encounter.  
Moreover, the law punishes those few who read because any hope for 
persuading a court to undertake an unconscionability analysis of a contract is 
lost to parties who admit to having read the contract.  Thus, the law does not 
offer consumers a reasonable option for making better decisions about legal 
                                                 
 * Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University.  I thank Brandon Stone for excellent research and editing services as well 
as Nicholas Muhlestein and Jacqueline Pendleton for research contributions.  I am 
indebted to the feedback from various conferences and workshops with the AALS 
Contract Law Section and the assistance from the faculty workshops at BYU.  I thank 
Nancy S. Kim, Margaret Jane Radin, and Juliet M. Moringiello for feedback on 
various parts of this Article. 
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commitments online.  Wrap contracts are merely the means for powerful 
contract drafters to legislate legal results. 
This Article contains a review of cases addressing clickwraps and 
browsewraps in the last decade, which amply illustrates that courts are 
enforcing them without much, if any, discussion of the length, print, density, 
or sophistication of the language or the parties, in part, because no one expects 
consumers to read them.  This Article then reviews the duty to read rule, and 
its meager exceptions, as well as the status of the unconscionability doctrine.  
This analysis supports little hope that courts will begin to police wrap contract 
excesses.  This Article then reviews and evaluates various proposals for 
addressing the problem of wrap contracts and concludes that, while most are 
some improvement, none hold any significant promise for real change.  
Finally, this Article concludes with several examples of the kind of notice that 
would be required to give meaning to the theoretical concept that the market 
will adjust as actors make informed choices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consumer online adhesion contracts, clickwraps and browsewraps, 
sometimes titled Terms of Service or End User License Agreements, 
are a feature of modern life.1  There was a time when these wrap 
contracts were funny.  We believed that extreme terms hidden in 
unexpected places were anomalies and sufficiently preposterous to be 
fodder for humor.  One of the most well-known examples of this was 
a Dilbert cartoon from 1997, where Dilbert, who failed to read the fine 
print in a software license, finds himself bound to be Bill Gates’s 
towel boy.2  In 2003, a SpongeBob Squarepants episode included a strict 
“Company Policy” written in ketchup under the bun on the meat of a 
Krabby patty.3  Mr. Krabs, on a brief diversion into having a 
conscience, stops Spongebob while reading it to the customer, 
declares that it is the “old policy,” and tells SpongeBob to fulfill the 
customer’s request.4 
                                                 
 1. Such contracts are common, particularly to Internet users, and pop up when 
installing software or using an Internet e-commerce sales portal.  E-commerce sales 
are sales of goods and services where a contract is formed over an Internet, extranet, 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) network, electronic mail, or other online system.  
Online e-commerce retail in the United States has been steadily increasing since 
2004, and e-commerce sales produced more than sixty-nine billion dollars in 
transactions in just one quarter of 2013.  Ian Thomas et al., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 4th Quarter 2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, Feb. 18, 
2014, at 1.  According to one 2011 study, more than eighty percent of Internet users 
made purchases using the Internet and annual e-commerce sales are expected to 
reach 1.4 trillion dollars by 2015.  Khalid Saleh, How Big Is E-Commerce Industry, INVESP 
BLOG (July 18, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.invesp.com/blog/ecommerce/how-big-
is-ecommerce-industry.html.  Retail e-commerce spending in the United States 
surged fifteen percent in 2012 and rose to be “seven times greater than the 
corresponding growth rate for total U.S. retail spending.”  UNITED PARCEL SERV., UPS 
PULSE OF THE ONLINE SHOPPER:  A CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE STUDY 3 (2013), available at 
http://pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/content/Media/Image/2013_UPS_Online_S
hopping_Customer%20Experience_Study_White_Paper.pdf; see also Saleh, supra 
(noting that U.S. e-commerce is growing at a rate of ten percent a year, while global 
sales are growing at over nineteen percent a year). 
 2. Scott Adams, Dilbert Comic Strip for 01/15/1997, DILBERT.COM, http://dilbert.com/ 
strips/comic/1997-01-15 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 3. SpongeBob Squarepants:  Born Again Krabs (Nickelodeon Network television 
broadcast Oct. 4, 2003) (responding to a customer who dropped her Krabby patty on 
the floor, SpongeBob reads:  “Krusty Krab policy clearly states that once the burger 
has reached the customer, it is his/her responsibility”); see also Born Again Krabs 
(Transcript), SPONGEBOB.WIKIA.COM, http://spongebob.wikia.com/wiki/Born_Again_ 
Krabs_%28transcript%29 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 4. SpongeBob Squarepants:  Born Again Krabs, supra note 3; see also Born Again Krabs 
(Transcript), supra note 3. 
PRESTON.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:03 PM 
538 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:535 
The concept of being caught unaware by overreaching terms 
hidden in unexpected places is no longer funny.  While courts might 
not enforce an obscure clause demanding involuntary servitude to 
Bill Gates, they now routinely enforce clauses effectively and 
practically hidden, requiring one-sided arbitration, disclaiming all 
liability, and otherwise massively reducing or eliminating the legal 
rights of an Internet user who happened upon a webpage with a wrap 
contract.5  Recently, the press reported on a hotel’s online adhesion 
contract where couples wishing to rent rooms for wedding guests 
agreed in the fine print to pay five hundred dollars per negative 
review written by any of its guests.6  The hotel later said its long-
posted policy was a joke, but no one was laughing.7  A comment 
thread on the Washington Post’s publication covering the outrageous 
policy discussed possible arguments to overcome the presumption 
that it was enforceable.8 
Online, consumers regularly enter into binding contracts with 
elaborate, multi-page terms, using unfamiliar, dense, and inaccessible 
language, which they naively assume are either sufficiently balanced 
and reasonable or will not be enforceable, if they assume anything.  
Professor Nancy Kim reports that even law students do not realize 
that contractual obligations attach to online activities.9  Online 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 713, 716 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding a provision that bound the borrower to arbitration while allowing the 
lender to pursue judicial remedies for late payments); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 
F. Supp. 2d 829, 838–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting Internet users may assent to terms 
not presented before them); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 
1224–25, 1228 (D. Haw. 2010) (limiting liability to amounts paid to the defendant, 
regardless of the theory of liability, but holding that liability based on gross 
negligence may not be disclaimed). 
 6. Events and Weddings, UNION ST. GUESTHOUSE, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140414161828/http://unionstreetguesthouse.com/events_weddings.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015).  The page has been revised since the incident received press 
attention to delete the “Reviews” policy.  Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy 
Marketing Genius Award Goes to the Union Street Guest House Hotel (Hudson, New 
York), WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/08/04/volokh-conspiracy-marketing-genius-award-goes-to-the- 
union-street-guest-house-hudson-new-york. 
 7. Volokh, supra note 6. 
 8. See orin ed deniro, Comment to Volokh, supra note 6, (Aug. 5, 2014, 4:25 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/04/ volokh-
conspiracy-marketing-genius-award-goes-to-the-union-street-guest-house-hudson-new-york. 
 9. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS:  FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 1 (2013) 
(“[W]hen I ask my law or business school students whether they have entered into 
any contracts in the past week, few raise their hands . . . [although] they have 
PRESTON.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:03 PM 
2015] “PLEASE NOTE:  YOU HAVE WAIVED EVERYTHING” 539 
consumers are largely unaware of the legal consequences of their 
actions, have given up trying to resist, or believe that somewhere 
there must be a form of justice that will prevent the actual 
enforcement of the more egregious clauses in wraps.  More importantly, 
however, even if we required enough alarms and buzzers that 
consumers could not overlook the fact that a contract exists, we cannot 
assume that they will read online contracts—or that they should. 
Even when the wrap does not purport to become binding without 
acceptance, online users believe that by clicking “I accept” they are 
effectively agreeing to borrow the software and intellectual property 
without damaging it, stealing it, or otherwise acting in bad faith with 
respect to the software.10  Thus, they believe they are agreeing to a 
license that is designed to protect software development.  Such an 
expectation is reasonable and is consistent with the user’s intentions 
and sense of honor.  Courts, however, enforce terms that are far 
more expansive and damaging to the user than simple intellectual 
property defenses.11  Many users are unaware that courts are 
enforcing contract terms—hidden behind hyperlinks or embedded 
elsewhere on a webpage—that were previously unenforceable but 
now waive important rights and consumer protections. 
Faced with what Professor Nancy Kim, Margaret Radin, Amy 
Schmitz, and others have painstakingly revealed about the harms of 
wrap contracts,12 scholars have squandered the last decade arguing 
that the solution is to provide the user with sufficient “notice.”  
                                                 
checked their online banking account, or downloaded software or music, or posted to 
their Facebook or Twitter accounts . . . .”). 
 10. The user understands some equivalent of the following and nothing else:  “I 
agree that the software and other intellectual property that powers this site is the sole 
property of online service provider and I am permitted to use it only for purposes of 
this site.  I will not copy, damage, interfere with, or otherwise diminish the use and 
value of such intellectual property.  I understand that the details of the permissible 
uses are available here (with hyperlink).” 
 11. Professor Kim aptly noted that while some provisions in wrap contracts may 
be shields to protect businesses’ legitimate interests, many are swords functioning to 
destroy the other party’s legal rights and crooks used for “stealthy appropriation (via 
a non-negotiated agreement), of benefits ancillary or unrelated to the 
consideration.”  Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1327, 1337–42 (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 9; MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:  THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Kim, supra note 11; Amy J. 
Schmitz, Legislating in the Light:  Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration 
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, Legislating]; Amy J. 
Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts:  True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 863 (2010). 
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Notice might be a miracle healer if drafters were required to provide 
effective notice in a one-swallow, palatable pill.  But notice of what?  
In a quick-click culture, “I accept” means nothing.  No one can seriously 
argue that any reasonable person would, or should, follow all of the “I 
accept” links encountered when online, even if the link is apparent. 
Further, under the current legal regime, online consumers will 
typically be better off if they do not read the contract.  Thus, notice 
can actually be harmful.  Perhaps the best option currently available 
is for an online consumer to simply “click and cringe.”13  This Article 
demonstrates why.  It evaluates various proposals for solving abuses 
involving wrap contracts, concluding that, while most are some 
improvement, none hold much promise for any real change.  If 
policy makers insist on falling back to a concept of “notice” to avoid 
policing contract drafters, notice must reduce the wrap terms down 
to a meaningful, understandable bite-size format to alert a reader to 
significant risks and enable comparison shopping with a reasonable 
exertion of time. 
Part I provides context on the extent to which wrap contracts are 
currently enforced in the courts.  It includes a review of existing case 
law on clickwrap and browsewrap contracts.  Part II explores many 
reasons why, under current law, reading a wrap contract is not a 
sensible option, including the counterproductive consequences of 
the duty to read rule.  Part III reviews and evaluates a variety of 
proposals for solving the problems of wrap contracts.  Part IV provides 
suggestions for preventing wrap abuses and allowing consumers to 
meaningfully shop around among competing online dealers. 
I. WRAPS AND THE COURTS 
Courts are now enforcing wrap contracts that would have been 
considered unconscionable in the early years when courts were 
beginning to recognize the utility of adhesive standard form 
contracts.14  This Article is not the place for a detailed review of all the 
recent wrap contract cases or cases in other contexts where courts have 
recently considered enforceability doctrines such as unconscionability.  
A general overview of trends with a few examples will suffice. 
                                                 
 13. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 822 (2007). 
 14. Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here:  A Short History of Sticky 
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 169–70 (2012) (arguing that courts are 
too accepting of boilerplate terms and standard forms); see also, e.g., Cicle v. Chase 
Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court’s finding of 
unconscionability and enforcing the contract terms despite the unfair credit 
practices alleged by the plaintiff). 
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A. Venue Selection Clauses, Arbitration Clauses, and Rolling Contracts 
Choice-of-venue clauses in adhesion contracts were, for a time, 
resisted by courts.15  However, since the Supreme Court opinion in 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,16 most courts now dismiss 
objections, stating that choice-of-venue clauses are routine and will be 
enforced unless some dramatic and extraordinary hardship is shown.17 
Like the historical treatment of forum selection clauses, some 
courts have resisted arbitration clauses.18  However, the Supreme 
Court signaled a willingness to enforce arbitration in almost all 
circumstances with its holding in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.19  
Rent-A-Center upheld the policy of encouraging arbitration at the 
expense of allowing judicial review of objections to contracts 
containing such clauses, including when unconscionability is raised.20  
A few courts continue to resist enforcing the more onerous incantations 
of arbitration clauses, especially those that waive class actions, are one 
sided, impose onerous fees on consumers, or are inserted into 
existing contracts post-formation without sufficient notice.21  Most 
                                                 
 15. See Polzin v. Appleway Equip. Leasing, Inc., 191 P.3d 476, 479, 482 (Mont. 
2008) (reversing the district court, which held that “choice of forum clauses are void 
as unconstitutional” and against public policy); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum 
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise:  A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1992) (explaining American 
courts’ refusal to enforce forum selection agreements was “out of step” with most 
foreign judicial systems). 
 16. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 17. See Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (charging 
parties attempting to resist such provisions with the “heavy burden” of proving the 
clause is unfair or unreasonable); Copelco Capital, Inc. v. Shapiro, 750 A.2d 773, 775 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (noting “forum selection clauses are generally 
enforce[able]” unless the chosen forum is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” that 
it will deprive the challenger of her day in court (citations omitted)); see also Keri 
Bruce, Note, The Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements:  Is the Public Policy 
Exception Helping Click-Away the Security of Non-Negotiated Agreements?, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1103, 1123–24 (2007) (discussing the argument that enforcement of such 
adhesion contracts promotes economic efficiency). 
 18. See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 
169 (5th Cir. 2004) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause that requires customer to 
arbitrate but not the provider); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286 n.4 (Tenn. 2004) 
(accepting the majority view that one-sided arbitration clauses are unconscionable). 
 19. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 72–73, 75–76. 
 21. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922–25 (9th Cir. 
2013) (upholding the district court’s denial of an employer’s motion to compel 
arbitration because the policy was provided after contract formation and the clause 
was one-sided and imposed high fees without the possibility of recovery); Schnabel v. 
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to compel arbitration 
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attempts to invalidate choice-of-venue or arbitration clauses in wrap 
contracts on the basis of unconscionability fail,22  although there is 
one notable exception in an unreported California opinion. 
In Mazur v. eBay Inc.,23 the District Court for the Northern District 
of California ruled that the wrap contract was procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.24  Oppression was present because the 
contract was adhesive, and surprise was present because the Terms 
and Conditions were presented to the plaintiff in a form that could 
only be read a few single-spaced lines at a time.  Furthermore, the 
contract was in block-text format, creating a “massive block of 
impenetrable text,” even when printed out.25 
The court defined substantive unconscionability as when the 
contract includes “overly harsh or one-sided results.”26  The contract 
was substantively unconscionable because, in part, it contained an 
arbitration agreement the court characterized as not bilateral and 
practically calling for non-neutral decision maker.27  The clause, 
although technically bilateral,28 consistently worked to the 
disadvantage of the weaker party, undermining its fairness.29  The 
court stressed the lack of mutuality.30  It is comforting to know that 
there is some point at which a court will reject an arbitration clause in 
                                                 
because consumers were not given notice of arbitration provision until after initial 
enrollment and therefore did not assent to the provision). 
 22. See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 915 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) (enforcing clickwrap that included arbitration clause after plaintiff failed 
to produce evidence of procedural unconscionability); Recursion Software, Inc. v. 
Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding 
that “clickwrap licenses . . . are valid and enforceable contracts,” and enforcing an 
arbitration clause when the user was required to accept before installing software); 
Mortg. Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582, 2004 WL 2331918, at *5, *7 (D. 
Kan. Aug. 23, 2004) (holding an inconvenience is insufficient to overcome a valid 
arbitration clause even though the clause was introduced after the initial contract 
formation but the buyer was required to accept the wrap by a click before installing 
the software); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 
2001) (clarifying that “[i]t is the unfair use of, not the mere existence of, an 
unequal bargaining power” that will invalidate a contract, and upholding the 
forum-selection agreement). 
 23. No. C 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008). 
 24. Id. at *5, *7.  The court defined procedural unconscionability as “oppression 
and surprise.”  Id. at *4. 
 25. Id. at *5. 
 26. Id. at *6. 
 27. Id. at *6–7. 
 28. Id. at *1 (quoting contract text). 
 29. Id. at *6. 
 30. Id. 
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a wrap contract, but by failing to mark the opinion for publication, 
the court nullified its potential effect as precedent. 
Another interesting development is the collateral damage of Judge 
Easterbrook’s facially narrow opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.31  
Although the case involved contractual terms that appeared after the 
software was purchased, the contract was printed in the product 
manual inside the box and appeared on screen when the software was 
installed and every time the user ran the software.  Zeidenberg 
ignored those terms and engaged in an intentional theft of a 
database with full knowledge of the higher charge for his intended 
use.32  Moreover, the opinion itself is limited by various requirements, 
including the ability to return the product for a refund for some time 
after purchase.33  Nonetheless, this case is regularly cited in lower 
court opinions that conclude that wrap contracts are now enforceable 
without further inquiry.34 
This trend illustrates the circularity of judicial review:  one court 
finds a new kind of contract enforceable, and other courts then 
assume enforceability because “everyone is doing it” without 
performing a thorough analysis of the earlier opinions and 
distinguishing the facts.35  As the Tenth Circuit observed in Hancock v. 
                                                 
 31. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 32. See id. at 1449–50 (discussing the higher price that Zeidenberg would have 
had to pay for the license to do what he did and noting that Zeidenberg “decided to 
ignore the license”); Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, 
Clickwraps, and Browsewraps:  How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of 
the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 8–12 (2011) (detailing the often overlooked context of 
ProCD and challenging some of the assumptions made in the opinion). 
 33. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (analogizing the situation to the definition of 
“acceptance of goods” that holds the buyer accepts the goods “when, after an 
opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection” (citing U.C.C. § 2-
606(1)(b) (1995))). 
 34. Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 137; see, e.g., Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp., 
No. 1:08-cv-187, 2009 WL 3713284, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009) (“SpectorSoft had 
every right to expect that its software should be used in accordance with the licensing 
agreement it provides.  Such agreements are enforceable when they require a 
purchaser to click on messages such as ‘Yes’ or ‘I agree’ in order to install software.” 
(citation omitted) (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452)); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 229, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (arguing that “[a] contract is not necessarily one 
of adhesion simply because it is a form contract” and citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451, to 
show the “prevalence and importance” of standardized contracts”). 
 35. The fact that so many of the recent clickwrap and browsewrap contract cases 
are not reported reflects the judicial view that these issues are settled.  See, e.g., Be In, 
Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 
2013) (stating that browsewraps are enforceable, as long as there is notice to the 
user); 5381 Partners LLC v. ShareASale.com, Inc., No. 12-CV-4263, 2013 WL 
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American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,36 “[c]lickwrap agreements are 
increasingly common and ‘have routinely been upheld.’”37 
B. Clickwraps 
Clickwrap agreements are the generally enforceable, standard 
form contracts that Internet users assent to merely by clicking an 
“I agree” option.38 
Most cases enforcing clickwraps hold that clicking is an acceptable 
way to indicate assent and stop before undertaking any analysis about 
the mere click in combination with the nature of the included terms, 
as well as the language complexity, density, and length.39  Even if 
                                                 
5328324, at *6–7, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (enforcing a “hybrid” 
clickwrap/browsewrap contract); Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 
WL 586513, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (“Burcham used the website, and he did so 
using an account that bore his own name.  Expedia is not required to prove anything 
more to show that Burcham assented to the terms of the website.  That Burcham 
either didn’t read the agreement or didn’t see it may be unfortunate for him, but it 
does not change the outcome.  Burcham is bound by the terms of the website’s user 
agreement.”); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825, 2005 WL 
756610, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (holding that “repeated and automated use of 
[Crossmedia Services’] web pages can form the basis of imputing knowledge to Cairo 
of the terms [of the browsewrap agreement]”). 
 36. 701 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 37. Id. at 1256 (quoting Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1226 
(D. Haw. 2010)). 
 38. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006); see also 
William J. Condon, Jr., Comment, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts:  Do Courts 
Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 454–57 (2004) 
(demonstrating that courts consider wrap contracts valid if the user clicked “I Agree” 
or the like). 
 39. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012) (upholding enforceability of clickwrap contracts when the consumer has 
sufficient opportunity to read the agreement, is given an unambiguous method of 
accepting or declining, and assents); Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. C09-1392, 2012 
WL 32380, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding that if the plaintiff clicked, she 
was bound to the wrap contract); FreeLife Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Educ. Music Publ’ns Inc., 
No. CV07-2210, 2009 WL 3241795, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2009) (enforcing a non-
disparagement clause in a clickwrap that made the user liable for “millions of dollars 
in damages for speaking the truth” and noting that “in many 
jurisdictions, online contracts of adhesion are regularly upheld as long as the 
applicant expresses assent to the terms of the agreement” (citing Feldman, 513 F. 
Supp. 2d at 236)); Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (enforcing a contract because there is evidence that a user clicked “I Agree”); 
Jallali v. Nat’l Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam’rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2009) (finding that consenting to the “terms and conditions” by clicking a 
“dialog box on the screen in order to proceed with the internet transaction” creates 
an enforceable contract). 
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clicking were the equivalent of a signature, that alone does not 
resolve the issue of unconscionability. 
Only a few cases discuss other factors besides the click.  One is 
Doe v. SexSearch.com,40 where the court addressed not only the 
legitimacy of clicking as acceptance but also the content of the 
terms.41  In addition to finding that clicking indicated terms were 
freely bargained for, the court enforced a limitation on liability 
against an unconscionability claim where “the terms are highlighted 
in bold, capital letters and with hyperlinks to highlight some of the 
more important terms.”42  Of course, a user may click without 
finding, reading, or understanding the terms.  The provision in 
question disclaimed all “responsibility for verifying[] the accuracy 
of the information provided by other users of the service.”43  The 
court did not address the length or density of the entire wrap, just 
this single provision.44 
To support its conclusion that the limitation on liability was not 
unconscionable, the SexSearch court cited two other cases where 
courts had evaluated the way the terms were presented.  In Hubbert v. 
Dell Corp.,45 the court found the terms sufficiently conspicuous where 
the link to the clickwrap contract was in a “contrasting blue color,” 
the disputed clause was “partially in capital letters,” and the 
beginning of the terms were in “bold, capital letters.”46  The Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania in Feldman v. Google, Inc.47 enforced a 
clickwrap that was in “readable 12-point font,” was “only seven 
paragraphs long,” and could be viewed in a “printer-friendly, full-
screen version.”48 Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc.49 is another 
case where the court enforced a forum-selection clause in a 
clickwrap, despite the fact that the thirteen-page printed agreement 
only appeared in a small scroll box on a monitor with only portions 
visible at a time, and the forum-selection clause was located in the 
                                                 
 40. 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
 41. Id. at 729. 
 42. Id. at 735–36. 
 43. Id. at 737. 
 44. Nor did the court consider whether the user could have clicked without 
finding, reading, or understanding the terms.  Id. 
 45. 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005). 
 46. Id. at 124. 
 47. 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 48. Id. at 237. 
 49. 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002). 
PRESTON.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:03 PM 
546 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:535 
final section and presented in lowercase font.50  These standards are 
not particularly high and fail to account for the reality that users 
cannot afford the time to read wraps and may not understand the 
implications of even ordinary language with legal terms. 
In short, current standards for denying claims of procedural 
unconscionability are sufficiently low that they would rout 
unconscionability challenges for almost all wrap contracts.  This can 
be seen, for example, in a recent case in the Northern District of 
West Virginia.51  The case does not involve a wrap contract, but the 
standard, by its terms, would cover almost all Internet users.  The 
court found that procedural unconscionability is foreclosed when a 
person is literate, has the opportunity to read, admits an attorney 
could have been retained to review the contract, was not rushed into 
signing, and had the opportunity to ask questions.52  Under this 
standard, almost everyone using the Internet in America would be 
disqualified from asserting procedural unconscionability.  The only 
factor that might be distinguished is the opportunity to ask questions, 
but, presumably, a website with a customer service email might 
suffice.53  Webpages with wrap contracts typically make asking 
questions inconvenient, even when a human being can be reached 
directly.  Such a person would (and should) be instructed not to give 
legal advice or interpret the language of the wrap.  As a result, 
                                                 
 50. Id. at 1010–11; see also In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 
2000 WL 631341, at *1, *5–6 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (finding reasonable notice that 
clickwrap agreement terms existed where the user had to agree to the terms in order 
to install software, and the agreement came in a small pop-up window in the same 
font-size as words in the computer’s own display and with the arbitration clause 
located at the end of the agreement); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 
528, 530, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (finding that reasonable notice of the 
terms of a clickwrap agreement was provided where the user had to click “I agree” 
before proceeding with registration, the agreement was presented in a scrollable 
window, and the forum selection clause was presented in lower case letters in the last 
paragraph of the agreement). 
 51. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, No. 3:10-CV-76, 2014 WL 496775 (N.D.W. 
Va. Feb. 6, 2014). 
 52. Id. at *12–13.  Similarly, in a case involving a real estate purchase, the same 
court denied procedural unconscionability where the plaintiffs admitted that they 
skimmed the documents, could have retained an attorney, were not rushed into 
closing, and had the opportunity to ask questions.  Schultz v. Dan Ryan Builders, 
Inc., No. 3:12-CV-15, 2013 WL 3365244, at *11–12 (N.D.W. Va. July 3, 2013). 
 53. See Nelson, 2014 WL 496775, at *2, *12 (highlighting that, not only did 
plaintiff have the opportunity to ask questions, but the other party would “seek 
clarification” if she was unable to answer the question immediately); Schultz, 2013 WL 
3365244, at *11 (noting that the plaintiffs had the opportunity to ask questions and 
were not rushed). 
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websites can easily circumvent this requirement by giving a customer 
an opportunity to ask questions while frustrating the possibility of 
obtaining helpful information. 
i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp.54 provides a more 
honest approach, where the court admitted that the clickwrap license 
agreement, which added terms limiting liability and disclaiming 
warranties in a preexisting agreement, would require at least fifteen 
minutes to read, and acknowledged that the users “probably do not 
agree in [their] heart of hearts, but [they] click anyway, not about to 
let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which [they have] been 
waiting.”55  Nonetheless, the court enforced the clickwrap.56 
C. Browsewraps 
Some courts and scholars have stressed the distinction between 
clickwraps, where the user clicks something that might trigger the 
recognition that there are legal terms, and browsewraps where no 
clicking or other evidence of assent is necessary.  Mark Lemley 
observed that “an increasing number of courts have enforced 
‘browsewrap’ licenses, in which the user does not see the contract at 
all but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site 
constitutes agreement to a contract whether the user knows it or not.”57 
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,58 the court refused to 
enforce a browsewrap where notice of the wrap was merely a link to 
the terms, and the link was not visible on the webpage without 
scrolling down.59  Such “submerged” links have led other courts to 
deny the enforcement of browsewraps.60  If the link or other mention 
                                                 
 54. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 55. Id. at 329, 337. 
 56. Id. at 339 (determining that the clickwrap intended to patch any holes 
remaining from prior agreements between the parties). 
 57. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006); see also 
William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts:  Do Courts Consistently 
Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 454–57 (2004) 
(demonstrating that courts consider wrap contracts valid if the user clicked “I Agree” 
or the like). 
 58. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 59. Id. at 35. 
 60. See, e.g., Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd’s v. Walnut Advisory Corp., No. 09-1697, 
2011 WL 5825979, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011) (refusing to enforce a wrap when the 
links to the contract were not added to the webpage until after the contract was 
formed and the links were submerged); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 
2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a submerged reference to wrap terms 
provided insufficient notice), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoffman v. 
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of the wrap is visible on the home page, courts do not require any 
evidence of assent more than browsing the page.61  However, one 
court found the gray link, although not submerged, virtually invisible 
on a gray background.62  More recently, some courts have suggested 
that someone who has visited a site more than once is deemed to 
have notice of the browsewrap terms.63  Arguably, courts will soon 
                                                 
Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 18 A.3d 210, 219–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) 
(finding a submerged disclaimer unenforceable). 
 61. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401–03 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the customer gave consent because the user returned to the site daily, 
the user was made aware of the terms and agreements, and active assent was not 
necessary); Harris v. comScore, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926–27 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that the link to the wrap was 
“obscured during the installation process,” although noting that if the link were 
shown to be visible after “further factual development,” the browsewrap could be 
enforced); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825, 2005 WL 756610, at 
*4–5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (finding the user had knowledge of the terms and 
conditions through repeated visits to the web page, which constituted acceptance of 
the terms); Canon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eufaula Sch. Dist., No. L-2063-11, 2012 WL 
1989225, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 4, 2012) (per curiam) (enforcing 
terms appearing above a space for the customer’s initials); Major v. McCallister, 302 
S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that user assented to forum selection 
clause contained in a browsewrap agreement because the page stated “[b]y 
submitting you agree to the Terms of Use” next to a button pushed to continue in 
the site and where links to the wrap were visible on every website page).  The court in 
Traton News, LLC v. Traton Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2012), aff’d in part, 
528 F. App’x 525 (6th Cir. 2013), took an intriguing approach to browsewraps and 
passive users.  The court avoided application of a browsewrap, and held that the 
contract should not be enforced for failure of consideration when the user did not 
“obtain[] a benefit from using the website.”  Id. at 910.  This issue was not addressed 
on appeal, where the court found the browsewrap did not relate to the dispute, and 
thus the case fell outside of the forum selection clause.  Traton News, LLC v. Traton 
Corp., 528 F. App’x 525, 526 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 62. See Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding 
that reasonable notice of the terms of a browsewrap agreement was not provided 
when a hyperlink to the terms appeared in small gray print on a gray background). 
 63. See Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542, 2008 WL 4772125, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[C]ourts have held that a party’s use of a website may 
be sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent to the Terms of Use contained 
therein (so called ‘browsewrap contracts’).”); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMB Techs., 
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that it was highly likely to 
be shown that the defendant viewed and navigated the website, and received notice 
of and assented to the terms and conditions by using the website); Pollstar, 170 F. 
Supp. 2d at 981–82 (finding that dismissal of the provider’s breach of contract claim 
is inappropriate, even though visitors to plaintiff’s website were presumably “not 
aware that the license agreement is linked to the homepage” and “the user is not 
immediately confronted with the notice of the license agreement”). 
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find that anyone who is not a computer neophyte must know terms 
appear somewhere, and so their visit to any site implies consent. 
To see the interplay between browsewrap and clickwrap 
agreements, the court in Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc.64 provides an 
interesting analysis of how each agreement is either successful or 
unsuccessful within the same website.65  The court first considered 
the enforceability of the website browsewrap based on the plaintiffs’ 
use of the site for a product purchase.66  The court found the wrap 
unenforceable at that point because “the only way for a customer to 
see the [Terms of Service] at that stage was to scroll to the very 
bottom of the page and click a link under the heading ‘LEGAL.’”67  
However, the court enforced the same agreement through a 
clickwrap, which was based on the purchasers’ post-purchase action 
in creating online accounts to register their products:  “The fact that 
the [Terms of Service] were hyperlinked and not presented on the 
same screen does not mean that customers lacked adequate notice.”68 
The Tompkins court cited Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,69 where the only 
possible place to click was on the “Sign Up” box.70  The click was 
effective even though the user had not been presented with the 
terms.71  The product’s usefulness was dependent on registering them 
for post-purchase service by creating an account.  The Tompkins 
court states this is sufficient because users creating an account are 
directed to new terms even though not prompted to review them.  
Thus, the court was not troubled by enforcing the terms of the 
browsewrap that it expressly found were insufficient to give users 
notice in advance of purchase.72 
At this point, the analysis parallels that used in ProCD for 
shrinkwrap contracts.73  The contract to purchase morphs into a 
                                                 
 64. No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014). 
 65. See id. at *5 (explaining that when a customer buys and receives a product, 
the customer is implicitly accepting a shrinkwrap agreement, which is inside the box, 
when he or she opens and keeps the product). 
 66. Id. at *6. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at *8. 
 69. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 70. Id. at 834–35. 
 71. See id. at 837–38 (comparing a typical clickwrap agreement, where the website 
forces the user to view the terms and conditions before assenting, to the instant case 
where a hyperlink to the terms and conditions was provided, but the user could 
assent without actually looking at the terms). 
 72. Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7–8. 
 73. Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(ruling that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable because the purchaser can reject the 
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contract for continuing use once the terms are made available later.  
However, in ProCD and subsequent shrinkwrap cases, the terms 
supplied after purchase are only enforceable if the seller offers a 
reasonable opportunity for the purchasers to return the product 
once they are aware of the terms.74  Moreover, such rolling contracts 
are typically only enforced when the purchasers perform an 
intentional act of accepting the later terms, such as clicking “I 
accept.”75  The Fteja court makes no mention of a refund possibility, 
                                                 
terms and conditions by returning the product), with Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at 
*8 (holding that the clickwrap agreement was enforceable because the purchaser 
had to take action on the website post-purchase when the purchaser clicked a button 
acknowledging assent to the terms and conditions). 
 74. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(distinguishing enforceable shrinkwrap cases where the customer was notified of the 
opportunity to return for a refund); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (explaining 
enforceability is tied to the opportunity to return the product if the terms provided 
later are unacceptable); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957, 2011 WL 
797505, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2011) (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)) (noting that the instant case differed from typical 
shrinkwrap cases such as Hill v. Gateway because the purchasers never received notice 
of the additional terms, nor an opportunity to reject these terms); Kaufman v. Am. 
Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 07 C 1707, 2008 WL 687224, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 7, 2008) (concluding that terms were “not enforceable because Kaufman was 
not presented with any indication that there might be an opportunity to cancel the 
contract by returning the card once the Agreement’s terms were made known to 
him,” although defendant had a policy of accepting returns and argued that 
Kaufman should have intuitively known that); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 
1071–73 (R.I. 2009) (holding that the shrinkwrap agreement failed to adequately 
inform the buyers of their right to reject and return the goods and, therefore, the 
buyer’s retention of the goods did not indicate assent to the terms of the contract). 
 75. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (holding that a purchaser assents to a 
product’s terms when he or she uses the product after having the opportunity to 
read the terms); Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp., No. 1:08-cv-187, 2009 WL 3713284, at *8 
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009) (“SpectorSoft had every right to expect that its software 
should be used in accordance with the licensing agreement it provides.  Such 
agreements are enforceable when they require a purchaser to click on messages such 
as ‘Yes’ or ‘I agree’ in order to install software.” (citation omitted)); Specht v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Netscape’s 
failure to require users of SmartDownload to indicate assent to its license as a 
precondition to downloading and using its software is fatal to its argument that a 
contract has been formed.  Furthermore, unlike the user of Netscape Navigator or 
other click-wrap or shrink-wrap licensees, the individual obtaining SmartDownload is 
not made aware that he is entering into a contract.”), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
2002); cf. Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 WL 586513, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (enforcing a terms-later contract that required clicking to accept, 
but noting in dicta that, although such affirmative act to accept is often essential, it 
may not be required in all cases (citing Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403)). 
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and the post-purchase contract required no affirmative assent.76  
Another odd feature about this case is that, in reaching the second 
holding, the Fteja court did not review in this context the cases where 
browsewraps were not enforced that the court cited in connection 
with the first holding.77  These include Hines v. Overstock.com, 
Inc.,78 where the court held that the link to the browsewrap terms was 
not sufficiently prominently displayed.79 
Combination or step-wraps, where the elements of a rolling 
contract are combined with a clickwrap and a browsewrap, may be 
the point where courts will acknowledge the limits of constructive 
notice of particular terms.  While the combination of a rolling 
contract with a clickwrap is generally enforceable,80 the District of 
Colorado found it a question of fact whether sufficient notice was 
provided of an arbitration requirement when the clickwrap license 
agreement merely referenced a separate Terms of Service and 
advised the reader to locate and read the terms online.81  Without 
mentioning the time such procedures would entail, the court 
nonetheless observed: 
[T]o reach the arbitration clause requires the user to leave the 
installation program, log onto the Internet (if possible), navigate to 
the proper page, and read the Subscriber Agreement, then return 
to the installation program’s scroll down window to read the 
remaining ten pages of the High-Speed Internet Modem 
Installation Legal Agreement before choosing whether to agree to 
the terms.  In addition, the arbitration issue is confused by the fact 
that the readily available agreements . . . provide a forum in the 
court system for resolution of conflicts . . . .  This creates an 
ambiguity regarding recourse in the event of a dispute.82 
In the analyses of wrap agreements, little time is spent discussing 
the conscionability of the agreement itself.  In short, courts in the last 
few decades have trended toward enforcing adhesion contracts 
                                                 
 76. Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (concluding that being prompted to accept the 
hyperlinked phrase “Terms of Use” before using Facebook’s services rendered 
reading the terms irrelevant). 
 77. See id. at 838 (noting that Hines v. Overstock.com explains that a clickwrap 
typically is enforceable when the user clicks “I agree” after being presented with the 
terms and conditions). 
 78. 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 79. Id. at 367. 
 80. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (discussing that a purchaser 
must take an action, like failing to return the product, to conclude a rolling contract). 
 81. Grosvenor v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-2848, 2010 WL 3906253, 
at *8–10 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 82. Id. at *8. 
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without much sympathy for, or even inquiry into, the facts that might 
give rise to procedural unconscionability.  Most courts have 
surrendered to the precedent for enforcing venue requirements, 
arbitration clauses, and rolling contracts.  Courts uniformly enforce 
clickwraps, and most do not even discuss the characteristics of the 
particular contract or the particular consumer’s abilities.  Those that 
do almost always dismiss claims of procedural unconscionability.  
Courts enforce browsewraps if the link to the terms is reasonably 
visible without requiring scrolling down on the webpage.  
Increasingly, courts enforce browsewraps without addressing visibility. 
Given the difference in context between paper contracts and 
online contracts, the traditional tests of procedural unconscionability 
should be taken particularly seriously.  Moreover, considering the 
sheer quantity of transactions requiring contracts as well as the size 
and density of electronic contracts, courts should reconsider the 
fundamental concept that any contract is enforceable if a party only 
has notice terms exist.  Even with notice that terms exist, a 
reasonable consumer will not read and respond in market 
measurable ways.  As a study by Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler 
makes clear, online users recognize that attempting to read online 
contracts is futile.83  Consumers cannot feasibly read and respond to 
wrap contracts in meaningful ways. 
II. TO READ OR NOT TO READ 
Even if Internet users are aware that there are contract terms 
somewhere, reading them is downright unwise under current law.  
This Part explains why, beginning with the practical reasons, 
including the unreadability of most wraps.  This Part then discusses 
the legal incentives to avoid reading. 
                                                 
 83. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?  Evaluating the 
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 165, 168 (2011) (reporting on an extensive study that demonstrated that 
requiring affirmative clicks to accept wrap contracts does not result in any significant 
increase in the number of consumers who read them).  Professor Marotta-Wurgler 
explains that “[t]he clearest policy implication is that increased disclosure is no 
panacea.  Disclosure is but a necessary condition for readership.  It appears that the 
cost of accessing the contract is not the issue; rather [the issue] is the expected benefit 
from reading it.”  Id. 
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A. Wrap Contracts are Unreadable 
A policy that depends on users actually reading all of the wrap 
contracts on websites they use would be inefficient.  Professor Kim 
described the time drain this way: 
One study estimated that it would cost the average American 
Internet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read 
the privacy policies of each website that he or she visits. . . . [Y]ou 
would not have time to engage in productive work, recreational 
activities, or relationships.  Modern life, in other words, would 
break down if we treated wrap contracts just like other contracts.84 
In addition to time drain, a second reason not to read wrap 
contracts is that they are difficult, dense texts.  Most readers cannot 
be expected to comprehend them even if they read every word.  
Wrap contracts are increasingly elaborate, monotonous, and written 
in ways that suggest the drafter intended to obfuscate the scariest 
parts by embedding them in excess verbiage and repetition.85  
Remember, wrap contract drafters do not have to worry about printer 
or paper costs, mailing or storage costs, or the cautionary impact of 
presenting a long paper contract to a consumer in its obvious 
fullness.  Key sections in wrap contracts are frequently presented in 
all capital letters, but that does not help.86  It seems unlikely that the 
drafters do not realize that this is the most difficult form of text to 
read because the absence of high-and-low letter patterns vastly 
decreases comprehension.87  Capital letters might draw attention to a 
paragraph (if a user scrolled down far enough) but they obscure the 
meaning of the paragraph. 
A third reason not to read a wrap contract is that they are 
nonnegotiable.  Even if the user has the expertise to snatch the legal 
                                                 
 84. KIM, supra note 9, at 213 (citation omitted). 
 85. See infra Part III (detailing examples of changes that should be implemented 
to improve wrap jurisprudence). 
 86. But see supra notes 42, 46, and infra note 87 and accompanying text 
(discussing how capital letters may affect the enforceability of online contracts). 
 87. This effect is well understood by drafters. 
All-capital print greatly retards speed of reading in comparison with lower-
case type.  Also, most readers judge all capitals to be less legible.  Faster 
reading of the lower-case print is due to the characteristic word forms 
furnished by this type.  This permits reading by word units, while all capitals 
tend to be read letter by letter.  Furthermore, since all-capital printing takes 
at least one-third more space than lower case, more fixation pauses are 
required for reading the same amount of material.  The use of all capitals 
should be dispensed with in every printing situation. 
MILES A. TINKER, LEGIBILITY OF PRINT 65 (1963). 
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significance out of the morass of a wrap contract, the user will have 
few practical options.  An economist would argue that a potential 
user can then “shop around,” but this is of little practical benefit.  
First, all of the other service providers likely have a very similar wrap 
contract.88  Second, if one’s family, friends, and business associates 
are on Facebook, for example, using a competitor’s service is not a 
reasonable choice.  Professor Eric Goldman, an avid defender of 
wrap contracts,89 points out that “a site with strong lock-in effects like 
Facebook is relatively immune from widespread terminations.”90  A 
“lock-in effect” arises when consumers are basically locked into a 
particular service or product because the costs of making a change 
are prohibitive, either in terms of money or, as with Facebook, in 
terms of severing associations to start over on another media site that 
does not include one’s family and friends.91 
A fourth reason not to read wrap contracts is that the legal 
consequences are frequently obscure to anyone without a legal 
education.  Even with a law degree, the implications of some terms 
would be unknown to all but a few contract experts.  A brave soul 
who tracks carefully through a wrap contract may not have the 
background or sophistication needed to evaluate what it means to 
assent to clauses stated even with common legal terms, such as 
requiring mandatory one-sided arbitration, limiting venue selection, 
or waiving a jury, class actions, or all forms of damages.  Damage 
waivers might be interpreted as waiving only extreme recoveries when 
in fact they likely waive every known form of damages.  How many law 
                                                 
 88. See RADIN, supra note 12, at 40–41 (noting that some products come from 
only one supplier, and that differing suppliers may imitate the terms used by others:  
“[o]nce one tour company deploys a form purporting to exculpate itself from all 
kinds of liability for any injury . . . forms with almost identical wording pop up 
everywhere”). 
 89. See Eric Goldman, How Zappos’ User Agreement Failed in Court and Left Zappos 
Legally Naked, TECH. & MARKETING. L. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2012/10/how_zappos_user.htm (referring to Zappos’ “legally 
irrelevant” contract that the court would not uphold).  For example, Professor 
Goldman said “[a]voiding this outcome is surprisingly easy.  Use clickthrough 
agreements, not browsewraps, and remove any clauses that say you can unilaterally 
amend the contract.”  Id. 
 90. Eric Goldman, Comment to Court Rules that Kids Can Be Bound by Facebook’s 
Member Agreement, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), http://blog. 
ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/04/court-rules-that-kids-can-be-bound-by-facebooks-
member-agreement.html. 
 91. See, e.g., Animesh Ballabh, Antitrust Law:  An Overview, 88 J. PAT & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 877, 884 (2006) (describing the “lock-in” effect in antitrust law, where the 
costs of changing will be substantial). 
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students realize what it means to incorporate the law of Texas or West 
Virginia under which waivers of gross negligence may be 
enforceable?92  Using market competition to solve the problem would 
require lay consumers to take the time to find and read wrap 
contracts, and to understand the language and its legal implications.  
That is simply not plausible. 
A final reason for not reading wraps is that the text, on its face, may 
be misleading and stop users from seeking relief to which they may 
be entitled.  Wrap contracts frequently include disclaimers that 
actually are unenforceable, and that the drafters know are 
unenforceable, but are included anyway.93  For instance, drafters 
often attempt to disclaim liability for personal injury resulting from a 
defect in a tangible, movable item, but, with respect to a consumer, 
this is the one thing the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) makes 
prima facie unconscionable.94  Consumers who read wraps or call the 
company, either before entering the contract or after suffering 
injury, may well accept without question the company’s statement 
that they have waived all claims to relief.  Some wraps claim that upon 
default the other party can seize property even if the defaulter has 
                                                 
 92. See, e.g., Valero Energy Corp. v. M.W. Kellogg Constr. Co., 866 S.W.2d 252, 
257–58 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Parties may agree to exempt one another from future 
liability for negligence so long as the agreement does not violate the constitution, a 
statute, or public policy.”); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 
508–09 (W. Va. 1991) (“[A] plaintiff who expressly and, under the circumstances, 
clearly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s . . . reckless 
conduct may not recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary 
to public policy.  When such an express agreement is freely and fairly made, between 
parties who are in an equal bargaining position, and there is no public interest with 
which the agreement interferes, it generally will be upheld.” (citation omitted)); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 1984) 
(finding that a contract to assume risk is valid unless it meets a specific exception); 3 
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 12:48 (2008) (same); 8 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:19 
(4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] (reporting that contracts that 
indemnify against tortious conduct are valid so long as they do not violate public 
policy).  In other states, such as New York, waivers of intentional or grossly negligent 
acts are not enforceable.  See Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (“To 
the extent that agreements purport to grant exemption for liability for willful or 
grossly negligent acts they have been viewed as wholly void.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1134–37 (2009) (noting that an unenforceable clause 
may be included because of the assumption of the other party’s sense of honor and 
lack of knowledge about the law, or as a deterrent to violations). 
 94. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2011) (“Consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded unless . . . for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods . . . .”). 
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filed bankruptcy, which the drafter surely knows is barred by 
bankruptcy law’s automatic stay.95  Other common terms, such as a 
waiver of intentionally caused harm, are unenforceable in most 
jurisdictions.96  Wrap contracts typically are not customized to carve 
out provisions unenforceable in a particular user’s jurisdiction.  Some 
wraps may include a provision several pages down that recites that 
some terms may be unenforceable in some jurisdictions, but gives no 
hint of which terms or which jurisdictions.97  Further, consumers 
without access to Westlaw or LexisNexis may have trouble researching 
the statutory and case law in their jurisdictions. 
These and other in terrorem clauses accomplish their desired effect 
if they so discourage the reader that he or she gives up before taking 
any action.98  Professor Jason Scott Johnston argues, in defense of 
                                                 
 95. Ipso facto clauses, provisions that dissolve or modify a debtor’s interest in 
property upon filing for bankruptcy, are generally unenforceable.  The U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code includes 11 U.S.C. § 365(e), which invalidates ipso facto clauses in 
most executory contracts; 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B), which invalidates ipso facto 
clauses that would cause forfeitures; and 11 U.S.C. § 363(l), which invalidates ipso 
facto clauses that would limit the trustee’s ability to deal with property of the estate. 
See, e.g., Emil A. Kleinhaus & Peter B. Zuckerman, The Enforceability of Ipso 
Facto Clauses in Financing Agreements:  American Airlines and Beyond, 23 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 193, 195 (2014); Paul Rubin, Not Every Ipso Facto Clause Is 
Unenforceable in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2013, at 12; Bruce H. White & 
William L. Medford, Ipso Facto Clauses and Reality:  I Don’t Care What the Documents 
Provide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 28.  Notwithstanding a waiver in a contract, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 361–62 stops creditors from seizing and liquating their collateral in a 
Chapter 11. 
 96. See, e.g., Flood v. Young Woman’s Christian Ass’n of Brunswick, Ga., Inc., 398 
F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Georgia law, which does not allow a party 
to exempt itself from gross negligence); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 
1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999) (barring parties to a maritime contract from shielding 
themselves from gross negligence, which ruling is consistent with the First and Fifth 
Circuits); S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1210 
(N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that under Alabama law, a clause that releases a party from 
“wanton or intentional misconduct is not enforceable”); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes 
Prot. Grp., 673 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (App. Div. 1998) (explaining that under public 
policy, clauses waiving gross negligence are unenforceable). 
 97. See, e.g., Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ 
customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (last updated Dec. 
5, 2012) (“CERTAIN STATE LAWS DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS ON IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OR THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN DAMAGES. 
IF THESE LAWS APPLY TO YOU, SOME OR ALL OF THE ABOVE DISCLAIMERS, 
EXCLUSIONS, OR LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU, AND YOU MIGHT 
HAVE ADDITIONAL RIGHTS.”). 
 98. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 1128–29. 
Contracts frequently contain clauses that are not enforceable—at least, not 
enforceable as written. . . .  It is possible . . . that such clauses are 
PRESTON.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:03 PM 
2015] “PLEASE NOTE:  YOU HAVE WAIVED EVERYTHING” 557 
wrap contracts, that customers will call the business in response to 
harsh terms in the wraps.99  The business may then make 
individualized determinations of which customers are worth saving.100  
If the caller appears to be a “desirable” customer, the administrator 
who answers such calls can waive contract terms for individual 
cases.101  If used enough in the industry to be relevant, this is a 
practice that would waste all of the time saved by the use of non-
negotiable terms as administrators shuffle through individual callers.  
More importantly, drafters know that most customers will believe 
what is written or what the administrator says is written in the 
contract.  Only the truly obstreperous, and those with excess time and 
ability to articulate, will pursue a complaint far enough for the 
chance at an exception.  This practice would have an undesirable 
result of rewarding that behavior and punishing the less aggressive. 
In addition to these overwhelming practical limitations, the law 
itself disincentivizes reading elaborate contract terms, as will be 
discussed later.  The best advice to clients, neighbors, and friends is 
to never read them.  They will not understand, and the attempt could 
come back to bite them. 
B. Readability Illustrations 
To illustrate the gross inefficiency and futility of expecting 
consumers to find, open, read, and comprehend wrap contracts, I 
offer some examples of what a user might find behind a hyperlink. 
1. The PDF Annotator example 
Grahl Software Design’s “Terms of License for PDF Annotator,”102 
its flagship consumer software,103 provides an example of a typically 
                                                 
mistakes . . . . [I]t seems certain that invalid terms continue to be used by 
those who are well aware that they are unenforceable as written, presumably 
because they have utility for those who impose them.  The most obvious 
reason is that the other party to the contract (or, conceivably, some third 
party) does not realize the clause is unenforceable as written or is unwilling 
to risk the resources needed to establish its invalidity. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 99. Jason Scott Johnston, Cooperative Negotiations in the Shadow of Boilerplate, in 
BOILERPLATE:  THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 12, 12 (Omri Ben-Shahar 
ed., 2007). 
 100. Id. at 14. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Grahl Software Design, Terms of License for PDF Annotator, 
http://www.ograhl.com/pdfannotator/std/en/License.txt (last revised July 28, 
2014) [hereinafter Grahl Wrap Contract]. 
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incomprehensible wrap contract, which contains vast redundancies, 
inconsistent waivers, and terms that seem entirely irrelevant to the 
transaction.  These characteristics, common to many wrap contract 
agreements, are a function of both the lack of physical space 
constraints and the knowledge that consumers rarely read such 
agreements.  In addition, the extreme language may both deter 
efforts to read, and serve an in terrorem effect on a user, ultimately 
leading the user to believe there is no recourse after a breach. 
Grahl users may follow the link to see a long chunk of text in all 
caps.  In ninety-five words in the first of three waiver paragraphs, 
Grahl states that: 
IN NO EVENT WILL [IT] BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY (a) FOR 
ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, INCIDENTAL OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS, 
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, LOSS OF PROGRAMS OR 
INFORMATION, AND THE LIKE), OR ANY OTHER DAMAGES 
ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE AVAILABILITY, USE, 
RELIANCE ON, OR INABILITY TO USE THE SOFTWARE, THE 
GRAHL SERVICES AND INFORMATION, VARIOUS 
DIRECTORIES AND LISTINGS OR ANY OTHER 
‘INFORMATION’, EVEN IF GRAHL SHALL HAVE BEEN 
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, AND 
REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF ACTION, WHETHER IN 
CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE . . . .104 
The program does not actually include any directories, listings, 
information, or for that matter “information” with quotes (since both 
are in the list), but maybe it pays to be inclusive.  The paragraph then 
tacks on another waiver of liability:  “(b) FOR ANY CLAIM 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO ERRORS, OMISSIONS, OR OTHER 
INACCURACIES IN, OR DESTRUCTIVE PROPERTIES OF ANY 
INFORMATION.”105  One would think this would do the job. 
The next paragraph states that “THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED 
AS IS WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.”106  But why stop 
there?  “GRAHL FURTHER DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, 
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED 
                                                 
 103. This program shows 66,843271 downloads and 5-star editor rating on 
cnet.com, as of March 30, 2015.  CNET.COM, http://download.cnet.com/1770-20_4-
0.html?query=PDF+annotator&platform=Windows&searchtype=downloads (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015). 
 104. Grahl Wrap Contract, supra note 102, ¶ 2. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. ¶ 3. 
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NONINFRINGEMENT.”107  To make 
that clear, it adds:  “THE ENTIRE RISK ARISING OUT OF THE USE 
OR PERFORMANCE OF THE PRODUCT AND DOCUMENTATION 
REMAINS WITH RECIPIENT.”108  Next the contract includes 
another waiver nearly identical to the prior paragraph, with the main 
distinction being that, in this litany, Grahl remembers to add 
“DIRECT” to the list of damages, although the phrase “OTHER 
DAMAGES” in both ought to suffice.109  This seventy-three word 
waiver refers to the product instead of services and information,110 as 
above, but those could have been combined. 
Most bizarrely, in a third all-caps paragraph, this time eighty-three 
words long, Grahl notes that the program is “NOT . . . INTENDED 
FOR USE IN HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENTS REQUIRING “FAIL-
SAFE” PERFORMANCE.111  Grahl then expressly waives liability for 
use of the program in the 
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AIRCRAFT NAVIGATION 
OR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, DIRECT LIFE-SUPPORT MACHINES, OR 
ANY OTHER APPLICATION IN WHICH THE FAILURE OF THE 
SOFTWARE COULD LEAD DIRECTLY TO DEATH, PERSONAL 
INJURY, OR SEVERE PHYSICAL OR PROPERTY DAMAGE 
(COLLECTIVELY, “HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES”).  GRAHL 
EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES.112 
This waiver is perplexing considering the software, PDF Annotator, 
is tablet-based software that enables the user to highlight, notate, and 
digitally stamp PDF documents.113  It is difficult to imagine any use of 
PDF Annotator that would make it relevant in any way to a nuclear 
facility or a life-support machine.  If the program were considered 
“goods” under the UCC, of course, a waiver of liability for physical 
injury would not be enforceable against a consumer,114 but how many 
                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. ¶ 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. PDF ANNOTATOR, http://www.pdfannotator.com/en (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 114. Under U.C.C. § 2-105 (2001), “goods” includes all things that are movable 
and tangible.  Although the valuable feature of software is intellectual property, and 
thus intangible, some of the first courts confronted with software analogized them to 
books, which have as a matter of tradition been treated as goods and which can be 
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users would know that?  Consistent with treating the program as a 
good, the waivers cover a “warranty of fitness,” a UCC term, although, 
even if the UCC were found to apply to downloadable software,115 this 
warranty would only be relevant if the purchaser engaged with a 
representative of the company who knew of the user’s unique 
circumstances and made a recommendation of this program from a 
range of available programs.  However, it costs Grahl nothing to 
include all of this, so why take it out?  One would think that lawyers 
are still being paid by the word. 
Finally, if a PDF Annotator user actually has some claim that survives 
this onslaught of waivers, the court of jurisdiction for commercial 
users is Landshut, Germany.116  Unfortunately, the wrap contract does 
not identify German law as the choice of law for consumers.117  Under 
European Union law applicable in Germany, most of these provisions 
would be unenforceable, at least against a consumer.118 
2. The Amazon example 
Another example is the Amazon.com Conditions of Use, which is a 
3,437-word, eight page (single-spaced in Times New Roman font 12) 
                                                 
distinguished in that the tangible medium by which they are conveyed is also the 
means of using the intangible value.  DEBORAH BOUCHOUX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  
THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADE SECRETS 282 (3d ed. 
2009).  The comments to the 2003 proposed revision to Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) Article 2, sections 2-103 and 2-105 expressly excluded downloadable software 
from the definition of goods. U.C.C.  §§ 2-103 & cmt.; 2-105 & cmt. (Proposed Final 
Draft 2003) (proposing to remove from the definition of “goods” “information not 
associated with goods”).  The drafters could not reach sufficient consensus to address 
software that was embodied in a tangible disk, although the predominant purpose 
test and gravamen test for mixed goods and non-goods contexts would likely both 
exclude from the application of the UCC software on a disk.  The 2003 revision was 
not adopted, so ambiguity still exists about the status of software under the UCC.  
The PDF Annotator program is downloadable and has no physical element and thus 
should not be subject to the UCC. 
 115. See also the discussion in Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, 906 
N.E.2d 805, 811–12 (Ind. 2009).  In addition, UCC Article 2 covers “sales” and, under 
section 2-106, a “sale” consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer.  
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2000).  This seems clearly to exclude a license to use software. 
 116. Grahl Wrap Contract, supra note 102, ¶ 10. 
 117. The Grahl Wrap Contract does not specify the choice of law that governs, 
however, it does assert that the software is protected by copyright laws and 
intellectual property laws, and the related foreign treaties.  Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. 
 118. See Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer 
Terms of Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1088 (2012) 
(noting that “substantive contract terms in social networking sites and software 
licenses clash with mandatory substantive consumer rules in the Eurozone”). 
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document.  It is a browsewrap that purports to be binding when “you 
visit or shop at Amazon.com.”119 Several paragraphs down is the 
“DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY,” comprising 268 words in all caps.120  It includes (twice in 
the first paragraph):  “THE AMAZON SERVICES AND ALL 
INFORMATION, CONTENT, MATERIALS, PRODUCTS 
(INCLUDING SOFTWARE) AND SERVICES INCLUDED ON OR 
OTHERWISE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH THE 
AMAZON SERVICES”; and, with various redundancies, it also waives 
all claims and warranties.121  Does this mean that all products 
purchased on Amazon come without a warranty?  Yes, at least as to 
Amazon itself.  It concludes:  “YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT 
YOUR USE OF THE AMAZON SERVICES IS AT YOUR SOLE 
RISK.”122  Apparently, Amazon is, in fact, fairly gracious in accepting 
returns of defective products, but it could not be required to if its 
Conditions of Use were invoked. 
Apparently all of the language in the first paragraph is insufficient, 
so the second paragraph begins with an express waiver of all 
warranties, including, without limitation, the warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, both with 
respect to the same list of items.123  The next sentence reiterates that 
Amazon does not warrant that the site, its services, or electronic 
communications from it (among other things) will be free from 
“VIRUSES OR OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS.”124  It then states 
that “AMAZON WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OF 
ANY KIND ARISING FROM THE USE OF” the site or anything 
possibly connected to the site, “INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 
TO DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, AND 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.”125  After many years as a contract 
professor, I cannot think of any other kind of damages. 
Improving on most wrap contracts, the third paragraph in the 
section, titled “Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitations of Liability,” 
states that some states may not allow the application of some of the 
                                                 
 119. Conditions of Use, supra note 97 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  The only difference in the two phrases is that the second starts “THE 
AMAZON SERVICES, OR THE INFORMATION . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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above disclaimers to certain users.126  This at least gives a reader 
notice that further investigation may be warranted, rather than the 
complete surrender suggested by the lengthy, repetitive disclaimers.  
However, few will or can read through so many capitalized words 
before losing focus.  Next comes a reasonably understandable 
statement of the mandatory arbitration requirement.127  Amazon can 
afford to be generous and clear in this statement, however, as there 
can be nothing left to arbitrate. 
C. The Perverse Disincentive of the Duty to Read Rule 
Courts are not inclined to police wrap contracts, and, when 
tempted to do so in a particular case, the court’s sense of mercy 
tends to melt should the party admit to having read any part of it.  
In this subpart, I set the context by explaining how the wrap 
contract may warrant a reanalysis of the application of contract 
doctrines.  I then discuss how contract doctrines punish reading and 
the duty to read rule. 
1. One stretch too far 
A classic World War II movie recounts the failed effort of Allied 
troops to capture a bridge at Arnhem, Netherlands.128  After a 
brilliant airborne drop and the acquisition of the Nijmegen bridge, 
everything falls apart.  Allegedly, British Lieutenant-General 
Frederick Browning told Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the 
operation’s architect:  “I think we might be going a bridge too far.”129  
A controversial and complex contract doctrine that has actually 
succeeded in other contexts may stretch on bridge too far when 
applied in additional contexts. 
In the last century, adhesion contracts requiring little or no overt 
evidence of assent became acceptable, subject to judicial discretion to 
avoid abuses.130  Preprinted forms became a norm, but the forms 
contained limited text because of their size and were policed by 
doctrines such as unconscionability and reasonable expectations.  As 
judicial policing has weakened,131 the online context has given 
                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. A BRIDGE TOO FAR (United Artists 1977) (based on Cornelius Ryan’s 1974 
book adapted by William Goldman). 
 129. CORNELIUS RYAN, A BRIDGE TOO FAR 89 (1974). 
 130. Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 168–69. 
 131. See Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 258–62 (2012) 
(discussing the lack of judicial pressure on businesses regarding adhesion contracts). 
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businesses a cost-free way to attach extraordinarily long, complex, 
and one-sided terms to transactions that in the paper world were 
governed only by the default provisions of the UCC.132 
Professor Kim argues that the rationales for the broad acceptance 
of adhesive contracts fail in the online context.133  The lack of 
precautionary signals accompanying contracts online has two 
significant implications.  The first is obvious:  online consumers are 
not aware of the extent to which they are bound to elaborate terms 
and so fail to push back.134  The second is more important:  real world 
providers of services and products shy away from elaborate terms 
because of the ways in which they would increase customer resistance 
and thus increase the costs of doing business.135  Because these 
restraints on businesses are absent online, businesses succumb to the 
temptation to throw in much longer and more complex terms in 
more kinds of transactions than they can in a paper world. 
Professor Kim’s book describes various factors that make wrap 
contracts uniquely dangerous.136  I agree with her list of distinctions, 
and add some additional reasons why online consumption is 
different.  E-commerce is very informal and quick.  When visiting a 
website, a consumer does not need to get dressed, drive to a store, or 
stand in line to check out.  There is nothing on a website that works 
to slow the urge for instant gratification.  Transactions can be 
completed without any serious thought and consumers may sign up 
for products or services they believe are free or cheap without any 
concept that legal obligations are involved.  Although a user can, in 
theory, explore a website for an unlimited time before making a 
purchasing decision, few actually do.  A website does not put users in 
a room with an employee presenting a multipage document to whom 
questions can be directed and resistance can be expressed.  Other 
customers need not wait while the sales clerk tries to justify an 
                                                 
 132. See U.C.C. § 2-326(1) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed); id. § 2-327(1) (“unless 
otherwise agreed”). 
 133. See KIM, supra note 9, at 162 (arguing that judges would fail basic classes in 
contracts when they “borrow phrases from one case and transport them to another 
without regard for the context,” such as with online agreements); see also Preston & 
McCann, supra note 14, at 134 (delineating the differences between paper adhesion 
contracts and online adhesion contracts). 
 134. See KIM, supra note 9, at 164–65 (explaining that wrap contracts often include 
complicated terms and require blanket assent achieved through a single click). 
 135. See id. (describing that companies are not afraid to include extreme terms in 
wrap contracts). 
 136. See id. at 162 (explaining that wrap contracts are not likely to be read and can 
involve underaged consumers). 
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onerous contract.  Ultimately, the sales clerk likely cannot negotiate 
any changes, but the cost of providing a forum for consumer concern 
induces businesses to make terms shorter, simpler, and fairer.  For 
these reasons, merchants impose elaborate contractual terms much 
less frequently in the physical shopping world. 
Even in those cases where a multipage contract is required in the 
paper world, the actions of seeing the formal print, sensing the 
contract’s weight or length, and affixing one’s signature are 
cautionary in ways an online contract is not.  Kim disputes the claim 
that following a hyperlink “‘simply takes a person to another page of 
the contract, similar to turning the page of a written paper 
contract’ . . . [because] turning a page is a naturally flowing, 
progressive act whereas clicking on a hyperlink is a disruptive 
activity.”137  Flipping through a paper in one’s hand is more natural 
than scrolling down or up to find a link and taking the diversion to 
another page before going forward. 
Finally, the nature of Internet use allows more powerful parties to 
intentionally reduce the chances of the user reading and 
comprehending a long, technical document.  Blanket assent is 
senseless when companies use too many scattered, weightless terms 
and design contracts that go unnoticed.138  The legally-significant 
differences in the context of online contracting have been noted by 
the Federal Trade Commission: 
[M]any online consumers exhibit certain characteristics, including 
inattention, unwarranted confidence, exuberance, and a desire for 
immediate gratification, which make them less likely to see and 
read disclosures . . . .  [A]s result of these online characteristics, 
consumers become ‘click-happy’ and quickly navigate through 
webpages, without paying much attention because they believe 
nothing will go wrong and want to complete the transaction as 
rapidly as possible.  As a result, consumers often do not read or 
understand the terms . . . .139 
As a result of these factors, drafters can reliably assume that almost 
no one reads the contract terms.140  I agree with Professor Kim that 
various wrap layouts suggest that “companies intentionally design 
                                                 
 137. Id. at 162 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 
113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)). 
 138. Id. at 200. 
 139. FED. TRADE COMM’N, NEGATIVE OPTIONS:  A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE FTC’S 
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ii–iii (2009).  The FTC is aware of these risks but has taken 
no steps to require business practices that mitigate the opportunities for abuse. 
 140. KIM, supra note 9, at 122 (“[I]t simply does not matter whether the consumer 
has read the terms—the assumption . . . is that she will not have done so.”). 
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contracts to escape user attention.”141  Additionally, as I discuss further 
below, even if consumers read the terms, their opportunity to reject 
certain terms or choose other suppliers is basically nonexistent.142 
Thus, the law’s approach to adhesion contracts that developed over 
the last century becomes so much more tenuous and fictional online.  
The context in cyberspace is different, and the law should account 
for the increased opportunity for abuses.143  Because of the 
significantly weaker forms of notice online and because of the 
significantly longer and more complex terms online, consumers 
cannot be expected to read and comprehend these contracts.  The 
presumption that they may be bound without reading becomes 
increasingly unfair. 
Something is lost in translating the law developed in a more 
judicially activist climate that applied to standard pre-printed forms 
consisting of a few lines on the back of a receipt to the tomes that 
hide behind a hyperlink.  As Chief Judge Shepherd said, when 
confronted with a software issue, “when courts try to pour new wine 
into old legal bottles, we sometimes miss the nuances.”144 
2. Scope of the duty to read rule 
The duty to read rule has many positive aspects.  By imposing the 
duty to read, courts simultaneously protect the drafting party from 
being blindsided by the other party’s negligence, while also 
encouraging the non-drafting party to become familiar with the terms 
so that the objective action of signing the contract accurately reflects 
the non-drafting party’s subjective intent.  Any kind of exception to 
this duty to read rule comes with some risk of a perverse incentive.  
Courts are generally justified in saying that Jill may not dispute a 
                                                 
 141. Id. at 200. 
 142. Id. at 122. 
 143. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 164 (suggesting that courts have 
disregarded basic principles of contract formation and ignore the “violence [of 
adhesion contracts] to core private law assumptions of free and knowing choice”). 
 144. Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., 906 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2009); 
see also Serenity Springs, Inc. v. LaPorte Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 13 
N.E.3d 487, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
[P]rinciples . . . were enunciated in a time when men drove a cart and horse 
and life proceeded more slowly but they are difficult to apply to an era where 
messages can be sent at the speed of light and goods can be purchased by 
the push of a button.  Although it is ‘frequently feasible to pour new wine in-
to old legal bottles,’ here, the old rule—albeit still valid—simply cannot keep 
up with the modern advances in technology. 
Id. (quoting Felscher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001)). 
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clause in a contract with Jack because she could have taken action 
before formation if she had read the contract and discovered the 
clause.  The law should encourage sober, adult parties to be diligent 
in protecting themselves rather than burdening the court system after 
the fact.  But perhaps an exception should be found if Jill is justified 
in not reading the contract. 
So far, only two significant exceptions to the duty to read rule exist.  
The most developed exception applies in fraudulent inducement 
cases.145  The fraudulent inducement exception may cover cases 
where the fraud victim was grossly negligent in failing to read.146  The 
Fifth Circuit explained that, when “an individual who imprudently 
executes a contract without reading it . . . [and] signs a contract in 
reliance upon fraudulent misrepresentations as to its contents,” the 
court is willing to override even the “gross negligence” of failing to 
read, so it can address the more serious fraud problem.147  In White v. 
Union Producing Co.,148 the non-reader “had the right to rely upon the 
representations made to her . . . although the means of correct 
information were within reach.”149  A 2003 federal court in Mississippi 
praised the duty to read rule by stating that to allow someone to 
admit that he signed a contract but did not read or understand it 
would “absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.”150  But in almost 
the next breath, the court determined that the failure to read in that 
case was no longer problematic once the other party is shown to be 
guilty of fraudulent inducement.151 
Notwithstanding strong language in some cases, the failure to read 
may bar recovery even if fraud is alleged.152  In theory, the fraudulent 
                                                 
 145. 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 69:35 (“[I]f a party has 
fraudulently misrepresented a document’s contents or induced the other party to 
refrain from reading the document, courts will allow a remedy, choosing not to 
permit a positively fraudulent party to prosper because of the stupidity or credulity of 
the defrauded party, subject only to the rights of innocent third parties.  In short, the 
law should not give any assistance to a knave, a scoundrel or a con artist who preys 
upon the less alert or more naive members of society.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 146. But see id. (“[C]ourts typically will not grant relief when simply reading the 
written instrument would settle the issue.”). 
 147. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1944). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 178. 
 150. Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 248 F. Supp. 
2d 584, 590 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (quoting Turner v. Terry, 799 So. 2d 25, 36 (Miss. 2001)). 
 151. Id. at 591. 
 152. See, e.g., Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d 1201, 
1207 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A party who could have discovered the fraud by reading the 
contract, and in fact had an opportunity to do so, cannot later be heard to complain 
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inducement “rule[s] operate[] on innocent as well as intentional 
misrepresentations.”153  Where a misrepresentation is negligent, 
however, some courts find it insufficient to overcome an integration 
clause, and thus evidence of the misrepresentation cannot even be 
admitted.154  In addition, a court may find that entering a contract 
without reading its terms to be so unreasonable that it negates 
reliance on the other party in an arm’s length transaction 
notwithstanding the other party’s misrepresentations.155  When the 
                                                 
that the contractual terms bind her.”); Anderson, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting 
Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber & Supply Co., 
584 So. 2d 1254, 1259 (Miss. 1991)) (failure to read a contract possibly is 
negligence); Gardiner v. McDaniel, 415 S.E.2d 303, 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]n 
the absence of special circumstances one must exercise ordinary diligence in making 
an independent verification of contractual terms and representations, failure to do 
which will bar [a defense] based on fraud.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Moran v. NAV Servs., 377 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989))); Belleville Nat’l Bank v. 
Rose, 456 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“The defense of fraud is, in most 
situations, unavailable to avoid the effect of the written agreement where the 
complaining party could have discovered the fraud by reading the instrument, and 
was in fact afforded a full opportunity to do so.”); see also Alan M. White & Cathy 
Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 251 (2002) 
(“Even the doctrine of fraud . . . has offered little (and highly unpredictable) relief 
from the duty to read.”).  The fraud often must interfere with the actual ability to 
read.  White & Mansfeld, supra, at 251–52.  Some courts have held that reliance on 
the fraudulent statements is unreasonable if the misrepresentation does not prevent 
the party from reading the document. See, e.g., Del Raso v. United States, 244 F.3d 
567, 571 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Spartan Leasing Inc. v. Pollard, 400 S.E.2d 476, 479–
80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)). 
 153. Anderson, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall 
Architects, 584 So. 2d at 1259). 
 154. See, e.g., Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 409 F. App’x 368, 
371–72 (2d Cir. 2009); Sound Techniques, Inc. v. Hoffman, 737 N.E.2d 920, 921 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000).  See generally UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation 
Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that integration clauses 
express the desire of parties to be bound only by what is written in the agreement). 
 155. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (S.D. Fla. 1996) 
(holding that the defendant disclosed its encroachment policy in the offering 
circular and in the franchise agreement and thus an attempt to conceal another 
document is irrelevant); Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation:  Fraud, 
Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 51, 66 (2013) (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 485 N.E.2d 974, 976–77 (N.Y. 
1985)) (suggesting that relying on oral statements is never reasonable when a written 
document contradicts a statement regardless of the presence of a non-reliance 
clause); see also Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x 572, 577–78 
(2d Cir. 2010) (citing Capricorn Investors III, L.P. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc., 886 
N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div. 2009)) (denying recovery where plaintiff relied on oral 
promise that conflicts with contract’s no oral modification clause); Ruffino v. 
Neiman, 794 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (App. Div. 2005) (“Reasonable reliance on the 
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contract contains a clause disclaiming reliance on representations 
from the other party, the failure to read issue becomes more 
complex.  In these cases Professor Russell Korobkin argues that 
courts split at least four ways when dealing with contracts where the 
non-drafting party claims that the drafting party made oral promises 
contrary to the written contract.156  Largely, this split results because 
of questions about what underlying legal framework is most relevant 
to such contracts, contract law or tort law.157  The case of fraudulent 
inducement illustrates that courts may see past the duty to read to 
combat fraud, but it offers insufficient precedent to argue that failure 
to read can be excused in other circumstances. 
3. The duty to read and unconscionability 
The other exception to the duty to read arises under the 
procedural prong of the doctrine of unconscionability.  If there were 
impropriety in the process of entering a contract, a court may 
                                                 
alleged misrepresentations is a necessary element of both fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentations and, where the alleged misrepresentations conflict with the terms 
of a written agreement, there can be no reasonable reliance as a matter of law.” 
(citations omitted)). 
Courts are more likely to excuse failure to read when the fraudulent statements 
themselves induced reliance without reading.  Some jurisdictions, however, take a 
harsher view towards those who fail to read.  See generally 66 AM. JUR. 2D Reformation of 
Instruments § 87 (2015). 
[A] contracting party is negligent if he or she relies upon the other party’s 
statement and signs the contract without reading it. . . .  Pursuant to some 
statutes, a failure to read an instrument before signing or accepting it. . . has 
been held to constitute a bar to reformation where relief is sought on the 
ground of mistake induced by false representations . . . [when] the 
circumstances were such that the complaining party, by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, could have obtained knowledge of the truth. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 156. Korobkin, supra note 155, at 70.  Korobkin’s first category are those cases 
where courts simply “follow the complaint,” meaning that they analyze the case 
under the principles presented in the plaintiff’s pleading.  Id. at 63.  Plaintiffs 
typically present the dispute in a tort-oriented fraud framework that permits courts to 
circumvent the preference for signed writings under the parol evidence rule.  Id. at 
64.  Courts using the second approach purport to analyze such cases in terms of 
fraud but instead effectively enforce the parol evidence rule.  Id. at 64–65.  The third 
approach keys on the distinction between “fraud in the inducement” and “fraud in 
the execution.”  Id. at 68.  “[T]he reasoning is that the parol evidence rule precludes 
a claim of ‘she promised me X,’ but it does not preclude a claim of ‘she told me the 
document promises X.’”  Id.  The fourth and final approach is “[s]cienter-[b]ased,” 
relying on intentional or reckless prior false representations regarding the quality or 
extent of consideration.  Id. at 69. 
 157. Id. at 57. 
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combine that with evidence of severe terms to find the contract 
unconscionable.158  If a contract is unconscionable, failure to read 
loses significance.  The factors that suggest procedural 
unconscionability include the lack of adequate opportunity to read 
the contract based on time pressure or failure to give a copy of the 
contract, and knowingly taking advantage of deficiencies in language, 
education or diminished capacity of the other party based on age, 
health, immediate distress, or similar circumstances.159  Procedural 
factors are often listed by courts but without independent 
significance and operate only as add-ons to more egregious 
circumstances.  These factors include disparity in bargaining power, 
adhesion, industry-wide monopoly on terms, and contracts for 
necessities.160  Procedural unconscionability may ease the court’s 
concern with failure to read, but a person of average education and 
language skills, who is not known to be in a present crisis mode, who 
has access to a computer and is involved in social media or online 
shopping is not likely to sustain a procedural unconscionability claim, 
notwithstanding the existence of the secondary factors. 
Professor Robert Hillman is concerned that merely giving 
customers the opportunity to read will result in courts being unable 
to find procedural unconscionability.161  He argues that mandatory 
disclosures may backfire by making questionable terms enforceable 
while doing nothing to increase reading or encourage businesses to 
                                                 
 158. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah 1996) (excusing a patient’s 
failure to read an arbitration agreement because of the “rushed and hurried” 
manner in which her assent was obtained just minutes before going into surgery); see 
also 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 70:113 (“[T]he duty to read and 
understand the terms of a contract before signing it is obviated when a party’s failure 
to read the agreement results from procedurally unconscionable behavior of an 
opposing party . . . .”). 
 159. See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362 (highlighting the “[f]actors bearing on procedural 
unconscionability”); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 18:10 (noting that 
procedural unconscionability “relates to procedural deficiencies in the contract 
formation process, such as deception or a refusal to bargain over contract terms”); see 
also Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 
2008) (defining unconscionability as “oppression and surprise”). 
 160. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362; see 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 18:14 
(“[T]he greater the harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms, the 
less important the regularity of the process of contract formation that gave rise to 
the term becomes.”). 
 161. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:  Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of 
e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE:  THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, 
supra note 99, at 83, 92–93 (positing that forced disclosure would “legal[ly] backfire” 
since it “would narrow consumer rights rather than expand them”). 
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draft reasonable terms.162  Curiously, by “mandatory disclosures” he 
means only requiring a business display on its homepage the terms of 
its browsewrap or a clearly identified hyperlink to terms.163  In 
essence, then, he argues that if there is a clickwrap or a clearly 
identified link on a homepage, sufficient notice exists to satisfy the 
procedural prong and thus makes a ruling of unconscionability quite 
unlikely.164  If the existence of a mere link is sufficient to reach this 
result, then an admission of having followed the link and read any 
part of the wrap is utterly damning.165 
In some cases, the court specifically notes that the plaintiff’s 
admission of having read at least part of the contract or the notice of 
a change in the contract is important to its decision.166  This point is 
illustrated in some very recent cases.  In Rodriguez v. Instagram, LLC,167 
an Instagram user, who read the terms enough to learn how to opt 
out of the new arbitration provision, filed a complaint in federal 
court alleging the unilateral modification of the contract was a 
breach of the duty of good faith.168  Obviously aware of the new 
terms, the user continued to use her Instagram account, and the 
court found this to be a knowing acceptance of the new terms.169  The 
court distinguished this case from Badie v. Bank of America,170 where 
the court held that the use of a unilateral change of terms provision 
to implement a forced arbitration agreement, that was avoidable only 
by closing one’s account, violated requirements of “good faith and 
                                                 
 162. Id. at 83–84. 
 163. Id. at 83. 
 164. Id. at 84, 92–93. 
 165. Hillman explains that most states require both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability to strike a contract clause.  Terms that are “insufficiently 
outlandish” to warrant the extremely rare holding that they are unenforceable 
merely as a matter of substantive unconscionability will be enforced because the 
opportunity to read removes the procedural unconscionability.  Id. at 92–93. 
 166. Recent examples abound.  For instance, in enforcing a gym membership 
contract, the court comments that the plaintiff, who did not graduate from high 
school, “admit[ted] she read and understood the agreement” when it enforced the 
contract.  Ramirez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. H-12-1922, 2013 WL 2152113, at 
*5 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2013), aff’d, 549 F. App’x 262 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  In 
Pennsylvania, a court enforced an arbitration clause in relation to a suit arising from 
the murder of an assisted care facility resident by another resident where the plaintiff 
“indicated that she read and understood the agreement.”  Estate of Hodges v. 
Meadows, No. 12-cv-01698, 2013 WL 1294480, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013). 
 167. No. CGC-13-532875, 2014 WL 895438 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2014). 
 168. Id. at *1–2. 
 169. Id. at *2–4. 
 170. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
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fair dealing.”171  The notice in Badie, which was included with 
monthly bills and notices, “was not designed to achieve knowing 
consent” to the new provision.172  Nothing suggests that the plaintiff 
actually saw or read the terms.  In contrast, the plaintiff in Rodriguez 
“had a full and perfectly reasonable opportunity to read, and did 
read, the New Terms; she could have declined the revised 
agreement.”173  The party prevailed who did not read the new terms 
notice.174  Thus, the customer’s best chance is remaining ignorant 
until the business attempts to enforce the terms in a wrap contract. 
III. SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO SAVE WRAPS 
How can the risks of wraps be reduced?  Intuitively, it makes sense 
to base the enforcement of wrap contracts on the concepts of the 
duty to read and sufficient notice.  Once on notice that contract 
terms exist, adults in our society are expected to realize that legal 
consequences will attach and take responsibility to determine the 
risks.  Courts assume that those acting with reasonable diligence will 
then find the terms, read them, and decide whether to negotiate for 
better terms or take their business elsewhere.175  Thus, most of the 
efforts to bring sense to wrap contracts have focused on notice, 
although there are a few notable exceptions, such as Professor 
Radin’s suggested limits on the power of private ordering.176  
Requiring notice of the terms so the non-drafting party can shop 
around facilitates resolution by the market itself, and thus, such 
proposals are more acceptable to Adam Smith economists.177  
Requiring notice may work well in theory, but in the online reality, 
                                                 
 171. Id. at 284. 
 172. Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 173. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 895438, at *3. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1644 
(2011) (“[I]f the terms of a contract are reasonably communicated, the offeree 
cannot be absolved from liability for failing to read them because the offeree had a 
legal duty to do so.”); Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank:  Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553, 556–57 (2012) (explaining how 
countless courts hold a duty to read as necessary to contract law and assume that a 
party with notice has “an ‘option’ to reject those terms—no matter how brief the 
window of opportunity that existed for the adhering party actually to read, 
understand and react to them”). 
 176. See RADIN, supra note 12, at 189–96 (suggesting filtering systems for personal 
computers that would alert the user to boilerplate provisions). 
 177. See id. (describing various market solutions for boilerplate contract issues). 
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most forms of notice do not convey sufficient useful information to 
function as intended. 
The duty to read rule suggests that if a contract can be found, 
individuals are expected to read and comprehend it before 
proceeding.  Because no one believes online customers read wrap 
contracts (or realistically could), a more astute analysis must consider 
whether users are given sufficient notice—not just of the contract’s 
existence, but also the terms of the contract—to ensure a 
knowledgeable choice.  This Part reviews a variety of proposals for 
mitigating the excesses of wrap contracts, most of which focus on 
notice.  All of the proposals offer improvements and seem viable, 
but none is sufficient. 
A. Notice Proposals 
The most common proposals address the sufficiency of notice, with 
a few creative but limited suggestions.178 
Many proposals provide notice by slowing the process of 
acceptance online such that a reasonable user will recognize that the 
terms are important enough to read.  Professor Juliet Moringiello 
suggests, for example, that courts look for more significant actions 
indicating assent than merely clicking, so that the electronic 
acceptance actions more closely resemble the solemnity and 
psychological weightiness associated with applying an actual signature 
to paper contracts.179  One of her suggestions would require users to 
type their initials near various terms.180 
Professor Kim proffers some similar ideas.  For example, she 
suggests that parties entering into contracts engage in “multiple 
                                                 
 178. Professor Kim’s book, for example, offers various creative suggestions for 
giving notice such as labeling the wrap contracts as “Your Legal Obligations” instead 
of the more innocuous-sounding “Terms” or “Conditions of Use,” KIM, supra note 9, 
at 186, making notice of the terms more visible and readable on the webpage, see id. 
at 187 (finding that a drafter who wants a reader to read the terms would not use 
“multiwrapping”), giving short notices indicating actions that will soon be taken (i.e. 
installation of software), see id. at 184 (explaining that short notices are effective at 
informing customers about the product), and providing notice of terms to users in 
the same way users may provide notice to the company, see id. at 192 (referring to this 
as the “‘turnabout is fair play’ rule”).  She would also prohibit the drafting party from 
making unilateral changes to the contract unless the law has changed.  See id. at 202. 
 179. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1307, 1347 (2005) (discussing that clicking does not often mean much to 
the average consumer and that, “[i]f judges find that this is the case, they could 
require Internet vendors to be more explicit, by requiring a more affirmative act 
than simply a click”). 
 180. Id. 
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clicking,” where the consumer clicks “next” to see specific 
provisions of the contract, signaling an assent to specific parts of the 
contract individually.181 
Other examples of Professor Kim’s suggestions include requiring 
consumers to type out and email assent to the contract to the service 
provider,182 or requiring better visual presentation of the online 
contract within the website or domain so the user is confronted with 
a visual of what rights are given up and what claims are waived.183  
Courts could draw a bright line that indicates how strong a term must 
be to require this individual assent.184  Wraps that “obtain rights 
belonging to the nondrafting party that are not directly created from 
the drafting party’s license or promise,”185 such as a right granted to 
the drafting party to exploit intellectual property and images posted 
by the user,186 for instance, would require such individual assent. 
Greater visibility would be, of course, a positive development in 
educating users that terms exist and that some are more important 
than others, a fact that might be missed if a person began reading the 
wrap and lost interest before reaching the overreaching terms.  These 
suggestions, along with the multiple clicking and initialing approach, 
at the very least, should make consumers more aware that they are 
entering into binding agreements that warrant further thought. 
Unfortunately, these proposals based on signaling the existence 
and the weightiness of the transaction have some flaws.  These extra 
assent requirements assume that the problems associated with online 
contracts are primarily about the newness of the forum and the not 
yet widely understood significance of clicking or merely browsing.  
Unfortunately, online customers have shown little interest in further 
thought when other circumstances should have warned them.  
Clicking a box, scrolling down a set of terms, or clicking “continue” 
                                                 
 181. KIM, supra note 9, at 196–97.  Essentially this proposal is that courts should 
require that some specific kinds of terms must be directly, specifically assented to by 
the user to be enforced.  Id.  She argues that requiring such individual assent would 
help to eliminate concern that a court is holding a consumer to an unusually 
burdensome term that she never knew existed.  Id. 
 182. Id. at 198 (arguing that the process of requiring the user to manually type his 
or her consent in an email helps to ensure the user is aware of his or her obligations 
under the contract). 
 183. Id. at 186. 
 184. Id. at 195 (“In other words, sword and crook provisions . . .[should]  require 
specific assent but shield provisions do not.”). 
 185. Id.  
 186. See id. at 52 (describing that companies often “use crook provisions to resell 
and share customer personal information”). 
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have become such common actions that they have lost their ability to 
impress on the mind of consumers the significance of what they are 
doing.  Similarly, these extra actions would lose their luster as they 
become more routine.  The Internet-instant-gratification generation 
will come to see the required action as a mere time-wasting hurdle 
slowing their access to the desired product or service.  Undoubtedly, 
consumers will quickly adopt routines for entering the required 
initials or typing out “I accept” without a single thought or, more 
likely, they will program their computer to do the required action.  
Kim admits, “[t]he goal of a specific assent requirement is not to 
ensure that users read online contracts; rather[,] the goal is to 
introduce a transactional hurdle that signals the burdensome nature 
of the transaction.”187  Just as clicking “I accept” is a better warning 
than that provided by browsewraps, these additional hurdles provide 
more meaningful notice to the consumer.  However, they will quickly 
become meaningless, if users do not take significant action in 
response to the signal, such as reading the terms. 
Further, these extra affirmative actions by consumers do nothing to 
convey the legal implications of the terms so that an intelligent 
decision about going forward can be made, nor do they do anything 
about the lack of negotiation power held by consumers.  Even if the 
user reads the wrap and finds offensive terms, what then?  A better 
suggestion may be to require the user to type out “I realize I have 
waived everything,” and maybe “I realize I have granted valuable 
rights to the service provider beyond the payment of money.”  The 
fundamental flaw remains:  many of the terms are inherently unfair 
and unreasonable, but the user has no option besides accepting the 
terms as written or not obtaining the goods or services.  Shopping for 
another vendor is not much of an option if the consumer does not 
know what terms would provide more protection. 
Professor Edith Warkentine offers a different proposal, a more 
elaborate scheme requiring notice that terms exist, express actions 
showing assent, and a requirement that the drafter provide an 
explanation of the meaning of terms.188  She argues that, if terms are 
burdensome, they should be enforceable only when courts can 
identify “knowing assent” in the process.189  She defines “knowing 
                                                 
 187. Id. at 197. 
 188. See Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability:  The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 473 (2008) (advocating for courts to use her “knowing 
assent” analysis which contains the above three elements). 
 189. Id. 
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assent” by three criteria:  (1) the conspicuousness of the 
unbargained-for term; (2) the existence of an explanation of the 
importance of the term; and (3) an objective manifestation of assent 
that is separate from the general manifestation of intent to enter into 
a contract as a whole.190  If courts were to incorporate these three 
elements, they would make progress in policing wrap contracts.  One 
problem arises in defining words like “conspicuousness,” 
“unbargained-for,” “explanation,” and “objective manifestation” of 
separate assent.191  Another issue is convincing courts to make the 
investment to delve into weighing the burden of terms and the 
factual complexities.  The latter issue persists in the variety of 
suggested solutions discussed in the following subpart. 
B. Increased Judicial Scrutiny Proposals 
Several proposals for taming wrap contracts ask the courts to 
reassess the level of scrutiny of the procedural aspects and substantive 
content of wraps.  They offer various standards for determining if 
wraps are enforceable.  Courts certainly can, and should, increase the 
scrutiny and develop common law standards of fairness in the online 
context.  These proposals, however, are not sufficient in the current 
jurisprudential climate to make a significant change. 
Professor Clayton Gillette argues that, in regards to standard form 
contracts, courts can overlook the lack of knowing assent so long as 
the parties’ best interests in entering into the agreement are being 
served.192  Gillette explains that the contracting parties are best 
prepared to represent their own interests; thus, if the parties are 
actively participating in the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the 
appropriate assumption is that the justifications for requiring assent 
have been fulfilled.193  If they are not knowingly involved in selecting 
terms, then the court should draw parameters around the ability of 
the more powerful party to impose adhesion terms based on an 
implied-in-fact type standard.194  “To the extent [courts] enforce 
                                                 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. (using these terms as part of the “knowing assent” framework). 
 192. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 679, 681. 
 193. Id. (arguing that rolling contracts “[p]ermit parties to reach agreement over 
basic terms . . . but leave until a later time, usually simultaneous with the delivery or 
first use of the goods, the presentation of additional terms that the buyer can accept, 
often by simply using the good, or reject, by returning it”). 
 194. See id. (reflecting the strategy of powerful sellers to systematically gain 
advantages over the buyer by discouraging the buyer from reading the contract). 
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these additional terms, [they] do so because [they] think that the 
parties either would or should have agreed to them or to terms 
sufficiently similar that it would not have been cost-effective to 
bargain for the alternative.”195  Of course, online customers are not 
involved in selecting terms beyond price and a product or service 
description.  This proposal would require courts to strike boilerplate 
terms that do not serve customer interests.  Such a doctrine, without 
extreme limitations and confinement to particularly egregious terms, 
opens a huge gap where self-serving parties can dispute their own 
prior choices and raise alternative theories about what is in their best 
interests.  While serving the best interests of parties is generally 
desired in contract law, at least insomuch as contract law seeks 
efficient facilitation of market transactions, it is inappropriate to view 
this as the sole or primary goal of the assent requirement.  The legal 
system cannot absorb the number of parties who will seek to have 
contracts rescinded or reformed after realizing they have made an 
error of judgment if the test is what, in the judge’s view, is in the 
parties’ best interests. 
Professor Robert Lloyd argues for what he calls the “circle of 
assent.”196  Like Professors Kim and Moringeillo, he argues that terms 
should require levels of notice based on how overreaching each one 
is.197  Then courts could use a sliding scale of readability and notice 
considered against the burdensomeness of the terms to measure 
assent.198  Unlike the notice proposals in the prior subpart that 
motivate the user to take more time in indicating assent, this rule 
seeks the same objective by requiring online businesses to post more 
warning flags, prompting the consumer to pay special attention to 
surprising or especially limiting terms.199  Lloyd’s circle of assent 
doctrine directs the court to “engage in a totality of the 
                                                 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Robert M. Lloyd, The “Circle of Assent” Doctrine:  An Important Innovation in 
Contract Law, 7 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 239 (2006) (defining the 
doctrine as the parties “will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the 
parties actually bargained and such other provisions that are not unreasonable” 
given the surrounding circumstances (quoting Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-
Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637–38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987))). 
 197. See id. at 260 (noting an arbitration clause buried in a computer’s 
documentation may be enforceable while a clause relinquishing an employee’s right 
to a jury trial that is buried in a handbook should not be enforceable). 
 198. Id. at 247. 
 199. See id. at 259–60 (stating a company should make an arbitration clause clear, 
conspicuous, and possibly in a separate document to ensure enforceability). 
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circumstances analysis and determine whether it really is fair to bind 
the customer to this term.”200 
As with requiring more deliberate acceptance, requiring warning 
flags is a vast improvement over the current system.  However, the 
nature of terms that require warnings and the form of the warnings 
warrant further exploration.  The acceptance of this approach 
requires courts to change the test for notice.  Under the existing, 
but under-used, unconscionability doctrine, courts can look at the 
totality of the circumstances and stack up factors suggesting a lack 
of procedural fairness.  However, courts have not accepted the 
invitation to use aggressively the unconscionability doctrine to 
police wrap contracts.201  If courts become motivated to shine a 
more realistic light on wrap contracts, weighing substance and 
notice tied to specific types of terms would be a reasonable 
approach, but judicial willingness to do that has been limited.  
Judges may be reluctant to make normative decisions weighing in 
each case the severity of the clauses and the realistic impact of the 
warnings.  A concrete statute or agency regulation, drawing clear 
distinctions and defining adequate warnings, would be more effective. 
Providing more analysis and application to the circle of assent 
concept, Professor John Murray argues that contract interpretation 
is ultimately a work of the “judicial vision” of contract.202  He urges 
courts to be more willing to attempt to shape contractual law in 
socially beneficial ways, rather than hopelessly attempting to 
“discover” the inherent meaning of the contract.203  Murray rejects 
the “plain meaning” mode of contract interpretation as literally 
impossible, and therefore a nonsensical ideal.204  Interpretation is 
ultimately done by the court itself after considering “whatever 
objective manifestations are available to determine what terms they 
                                                 
 200. Id. at 263–64.  In describing the test, Lloyd includes two basic factors:  “1) the 
extent to which the customer should have been aware of the provision; and 2) the 
extent to which the provision shifts to the customer a risk the customer was not 
expecting.”  Id. at 246.  This sliding scale would take into account factors that lend 
themselves to arguing for both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  See id. 
at 263–64.  In other words, where an action or term posed by the offending party 
appears to contain elements of unconscionability but is not necessarily egregious 
enough to meet high unconscionability standards, the complaining party will still be 
able to use these facts as evidence that assent did not properly occur. 
 201. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 202. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Judicial Vision of Contract:  The Constructed Circle of 
Assent and Unconscionability, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 267–69 (2014). 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. at 267–68 & n.21. 
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deem appropriate for inclusion in the constructed circle of assent 
they create, regardless of the actual intention of the parties.”205  
Accordingly, changing judicial attitudes is the only reasonable 
reform.  Murray continues, “[e]ven where the language of an 
agreement presents no troubling issue concerning its meaning, its 
interpretation may be subject to an overriding policy.”206  Murray 
points to the historical tendency to enforce charitable promises in 
the absence of traditional validation devices and to read anti-
assignment clauses as narrowly as possible.207 
Indeed, courts of the consumer protection era were fairly 
aggressive in applying policy restraints to private ordering.208  Courts 
have the tools of unconscionability and good faith doctrines, which 
would enable them to take action.209  But current trends have covered 
existing doctrines with dust as discussed in Part I.210  Now, most courts 
fear being labeled as activist and, being more enamored with law and 
economics jurisprudence, tend to believe they advance economic 
policy by enforcing contract language as the drafter intended without 
concern for the user’s intent.211  If judicial resistance to extending 
already-weakened contract doctrines into new forms of business 
practice is not established early, it is very unlikely to come later when 
the practices become common and judges measure reasonableness 
against the industry norm.  Online contracts had a chance at a fresh 
perspective and largely missed it. 
Moreover, most wrap contracts require arbitration, and many 
commentators allege there is systemic unfairness and bias that favors 
businesses in arbitration.212  Because arbitrators are only paid if hired 
                                                 
 205. Id. at 266–67. 
 206. Id. at 390. 
 207. Id. at 391. 
 208. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 151–52. 
 209. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet 
Privacy:  The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 
452, 453 n.8, 468–69 (2013). 
 210. See supra Part I (finding the old doctrines are less applicable to the longer 
and more complex online contracts). 
 211. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 166–69 (chronicling various 
Supreme Court and circuit cases while arguing that newly developed trends 
demonstrate courts have accepted implications of the drafter’s intent rather than 
manifestations of a user’s knowing assent). 
 212. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami:  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (discussing how consumers are 
negatively impacted by a recent court decision allowing companies to be protected 
from class actions through arbitration clauses); Letter from Richard M. Alderman et 
al., Professors of Consumer Law & Banking Law, to Senators Dodd and Shelby and 
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for a particular case, arguments against arbitration are often based on 
what is perceived as “repeat-arbitrator bias”—the idea that the 
arbitrator will favor the repeat players who are more likely to hire 
future arbitrators.213  Some recent studies suggest that the research 
on which this negative perception is based is incomplete and the 
seemingly high rates of business successes in arbitration may be 
traced to a combination of factors.214  But no one is arguing that 
arbitrators are naturally biased toward consumers.  Unlike jurors, 
arbitrators are more likely to come from the business sector.215  In 
addition, arbitrators want to avoid laying down new policy norms and 
to resolve the dispute at hand efficiently without much focus on the 
overall social implications of their rulings.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
advised that “the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a 
contract, not to make public policy.”216  Thus, I argue that proposals 
based on courts adopting more stringent standards without any 
particular standards are overly optimistic.  What is left, then, are new 
and more creative ways to warn consumers to look out for themselves, 
with the hope that businesses will back off from aggressive terms so 
they can keep customers. 
                                                 
Representatives Frank and Bachus 5–6 (Sept. 29, 2009), available at 
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf (“Studies . . . 
suggest[] that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive to find for those 
who select them:  the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.”); see 
also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services—
An Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 285, 369–70 (2005) (“[S]tudies have generally criticized the UDRP 
providers for being biased towards complainants and for leaving the respondents 
without a fair defense.”). 
 213. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1247, 1310 n.178 (2009) (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The 
Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 209–10 & tbls.2–3 (1997)). 
 214. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA 
Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 846 (2010) (finding no 
statistically significant repeat-player effect when using a traditional definition, but 
finding some evidence of repeat-player effect using an alternative definition, and 
concluding that the results suggest repeat players’ success may be a result of better 
case screening than arbitrator bias). 
 215. See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration:  Due Process and Other Constitutional 
Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 859 (2011) (“[B]ecause the current composition of 
many available pools of arbitrators are non-diverse, possibly biased in favor of repeat 
players and disproportionately conservative, consumers, employees, and other 
plaintiffs do not have the same opportunities as corporate defendants to choose 
decision-makers who might be biased in their favor.”). 
 216. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 (2010). 
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IV. TAMING WRAPS 
Traditional notions of contract assent and interpretation have 
primarily worked to ensure that the actual intentions of the differing 
parties are known.217  Transactions and interactions tend to be less 
conscious, less negotiable, less tangible, far more frequent, and more 
easily hidden in Internet contracting than with traditional standard 
forms.  Notice proposals assume that the immediacy of Internet 
transactions can be overcome.  But increasing consumer notice that 
terms exist does not adequately address the problems with online 
contracts.  Most importantly, the issue of comprehensibility remains:  
until there are more aggressive standards for presenting terms in 
clear and manageable ways, no amount of flashing lights will help.  
Most proposals fail to make significant improvements in conveying 
usable information, and so the benefits from increased notice are 
heavily outweighed by the cumbersome and time-consuming 
impositions on the user, who will resent the impositions, act no 
differently, and ultimately receive no benefit. 
A. Bite-Sized Notice 
If courts are going to base enforceability on notice, then the notice 
must be such that it quickly provides consumers with sufficient knowledge 
to make a reasonable decision about entering into the contract.  Useful 
notice must reduce the wrap terms down to a concise and 
understandable format that allows a reader, within the realistic confines 
of time and patience, to recognize the significance of contract terms and 
enable efficient comparisons to other product and service providers. 
I argue that online contract terms can be commoditized and 
standardized in such a way as to make rational comparison shopping a 
reality.  Most shoppers can process only a limited number of 
characteristics of competing products and services.  Naturally, the only 
features that draw any attention are related to:  (1) price, (2) 
appearance, (3) size or quantity, and (4) compatibility with the end 
use objective.  Nonetheless, some detail comparison shopping in even 
very small transactions flourishes in a few industries and contexts based 
on disclosure of otherwise opaque product features beyond these four.  
For example, parents may look for children’s pajamas that are flame 
resistant.  Many consumers look for and purchase products that are 
recycled or recyclable, use less energy, are made in the United States, and 
                                                 
 217. See, e.g., Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 411 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(stating a main tenet of contract interpretation is to construe the agreement in 
accordance with the parties’ intent). 
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so forth.  Most grocery shoppers look at the calorie count and contents 
on a can or package.  Can the legal import of a wrap contract be disclosed 
in a way that allows similarly efficient and fast comparison of features? 
Professor Amy Schmitz proposed, in the arbitration clause context, 
that companies be required to disclose the terms of their arbitration 
provisions “in a concise and readable format” through a mandated 
simple grid that would be posted on a central website.218  Schmitz 
persuasively argues that such a disclosure, at a minimum, would alert 
consumers that arbitration provisions are controversial and carry 
significant consequences.219  She suggests that bold disclosures “may 
prompt consumers to question and perhaps join together to resist or 
change overly burdensome arbitration terms.”220  I agree both with the 
idea of grid type disclosure and that the ultimate goal is to draw sufficient 
attention to these terms that customers begin to ask questions and push.  
The best instrument for massive market change is customer protest. 
However, I propose something more specific:  the “calorie and 
content” box for a wrap contract.  Consider the following example: 
 
Contract [link to contract] includes: 3,453 words (10 standard pages in 
print) 
Mandatory arbitration Yes
     Only binds user, not business No
Prohibition of suits joined with other 
users (class actions) 
Yes
Place of dispute resolution Santa Clara County, CA
Applicable law California
Grant to provider of right to use any 
content posted by user 
Yes
Waiver of:  all damages Yes 
     Direct damages 
     Consequential damages
     Incidental damages 
     Punitive damages 
Business’s right to alter contract 
without posting notice to user 
Yes
Business’s right to collect, sort and 
store data 
     For its own use Yes
     For the use of its affiliates Yes
     To sell to others Yes
     User’s right to opt out at [link] Yes
                                                 
 218. Schmitz, Legislating, supra note 12, at 168–69. 
 219. See id. at 169–70 (envisioning a central database that may help regulators 
(and consumers) be more aware of harsh terms). 
 220. Id. 
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This box is sufficiently direct that a consumer could compare the 
boxes of a variety of competitors in a reasonable amount of time.  
Although the legal words are not defined, the meaning could be 
stated either in lay terms or sufficiently condensed to make using an 
online search engine to find a meaning more practicable.  Further, 
the selection of these clauses for disclosure signals their importance 
and a consumer may use such a list as a means for comparison 
without fully understanding what each type of clause accomplishes.  
Such a form will not introduce significant costs in preparation; 
businesses can quickly fill and post the form when attaching a wrap 
contract to a site. 
Of course, as more types of extreme clauses become common, such 
a form may need to be expanded.  The public awareness created by 
this many disclosures may sufficiently stifle the urge to push the 
envelope on expanding business-favoring clauses and provide judges 
with a means of identifying the use of such undisclosed, burdensome 
terms as unconscionable. 
To be effective, such a content box must be posted where 
consumers can see it.  The box message is sufficiently direct that a 
statement of its existence and a link to the page showing the box that 
must be followed before proceeding with an “I accept” click beneath 
the box may be sufficient. 
B. Best Practice Standard 
The same effect of alerting customers to extreme terms can be met 
by methods other than the conventional posted notice on the site.  
Critical to alerting users to an extraordinary contract characteristic is 
some determination of what “ordinary expectations” actually are.  
Another variation of the wrap contract “content box” would be a 
version in which the online service provider must identify what 
features of its wrap contract differ from a publicly available 
“standard” wrap contract that has been drafted to balance interests 
between the parties and recommended for use by a respected entity. 
A significant function of the UCC is articulating some carefully 
considered, interest-balanced terms that apply automatically unless 
changed by agreement.221  One option would require disclosure of 
                                                 
 221. See U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2001) (“[T]he effect of provisions of [the Uniform 
Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.” (alteration in original)).  Several 
sections of Article 2 expressly note that the rules are default.  See, e.g., id. §  2-326(1) 
(“[u]nless otherwise agreed”); id. § 2-327(1) (“unless otherwise agreed”); see also 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 615 (1998) (“[T]the ‘off-the-rack’ provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
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variations in wrap terms from those included the UCC.  Many 
voluntary, private, or collective associations issue standards or “best 
practice” guidelines.  The American Law Institute (ALI), or another 
such organization, could compile one or more options for a 
“standard” version of a wrap contract, particularly one that addresses 
the limited license of intellectual property, and suggest that these 
terms be adopted in most online contexts.  The ALI had such an 
opportunity when proposing its Principles of Software Contracts (the 
“Principles”).222  The principles were drafted as a guide to aid courts 
and practitioners in navigating transactions involving software 
contracts.223  The Principles, however, missed the opportunity to 
provide a set of balanced terms as a standard and focused instead on 
the issue of notice in the presentation of online contracts.224  The 
Principles have received little attention and have not been cited by 
courts in the years since their adoption.225  The American Law 
Institute also began a project to create a new restatement covering 
consumer contracts.226  Although this effort is intended to “restate” 
existing law, a similar project could draft a model of online contracts 
containing standard neutral terms. 
If such a standard existed, online service providers could save 
considerable effort by merely incorporating this standard set of 
terms rather than drafting new terms requiring meaningful 
additional disclosure.  Moreover, a provider could market that it 
offers the “best practice” terms, which would be freely available 
online for consumers to view.  At the least, consumers may be 
suspicious of an online service provider that opts not to use the 
                                                 
Code . . . are majoritarian defaults that save most parties the expense of specifying 
such terms as time of delivery, place of delivery, or even price in their agreements.” 
(citing Ian Ayres, Making a Difference:  The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1396–97 (1992)). 
 222. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2010). 
 223. Publications Catalog:  Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, A.L.I., 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=121 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 224. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 83, at 167 (noting that increased 
disclosure could lead to courts to be more lenient when regulating contract terms). 
 225. As of March 3, 2015 a search in Westlaw using “Principles of Software 
Contracts,” “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” and “principles /10 
software,” returns no relevant cases, other than Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing 
Group, 906 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2009), where the fact that the ALI had launched 
the project was mentioned in passing. 
 226. See Current Projects:  Restatement Third, The Law of Consumer Contracts, A.L.I., 
https://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=25 (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015). 
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standard terms, thus incentivizing online service providers to plainly 
disclose and justify any deviations. 
C. Limiting Non-Negotiable Terms 
Requiring online service providers to make wrap contracts at least 
partially negotiable could both resolve the problem of consumer 
awareness in wrap contract acceptance and give consumers some 
bargaining power.  Some user choices could be inserted into these 
agreements without eliminating wrap contract efficiency.  For 
example, certain terms, such as arbitration agreements, venue 
restrictions, or modification clauses, could fall into a category of 
“necessarily negotiable terms” in wrap contracts.  The online service 
provider would be required to provide some options regarding 
these terms from which a consumer would have to choose during 
contract acceptance.  An option to exclude a term could possibly be 
tied to a price if drafters show restraint in actually reflecting the 
increased cost in the price and not setting a price so high as to be a 
punishment or penalty for choosing the option.  If a choice of 
venue clause is contained in a wrap contract, the online service 
provider would be required to allow the consumer to choose 
between two different venues and affirmatively accept one during 
the contracting process.  Or, for contract modification clauses, the 
online service provider would be required to ask the consumer 
which method the consumer would prefer to receive information 
regarding ongoing contract modifications. 
This is not the most effective of my suggestions.  Certainly, the 
negotiation requirements discussed above have great potential of 
posing significant burdens on both online service providers and 
consumers.  But adopted to some degree, negotiation requirements 
could be key in eliminating much of the ignorance in the electronic 
contracting process.  To alleviate some concerns for the online 
service providers, these negotiation options may not necessarily be 
required of each online service provider, but rather could be one of 
a few different ways an online service provider could ensure fair 
notice.  Thus, an online service provider could look at a range of 
possible methods through which it could best avoid lack of assent 
claims and choose the method that works best for the type of service 
provided and the types of terms contained in the online service 
provider’s wrap contract. 
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D. Fostering Consumer Outrage 
Public outrage seems to be the most likely effective means of 
convincing online providers to revise their wrap contracts.  
Unfortunately, only a few examples of public pressure have occurred 
thus far, and the result of each was only a change in a single wrap, 
without a market-wide impact.  This subpart gives examples of 
effective consumer campaigns and offers some suggestions for 
fostering healthy consumer pushback. 
Public backlash was instrumental in reversing a change to 
Facebook’s privacy policy in January 2011.227  Facebook announced, 
via its developer blog, a new feature that would provide application 
developers with access to user phone numbers and addresses.228  
Though this change was announced quietly at the end of the week, 
negative public response inspired the company to suspend the 
feature as of the following Monday.229  Although the change required 
users to expressly grant permission for their information to be 
shared, the surrounding confusion and frequent changes made to 
Facebook’s privacy policy fueled public skepticism.230  Further, while 
application developers are not allowed to share information gathered 
from Facebook, such policies had been violated previously, as in 
2010, when marketing company Rapleaf sold private information 
gathered from Facebook to advertisers.231 
This new Facebook feature was publicized on industry websites, 
such as Gizmodo, where Max Read opined “Facebook should know 
better than this,” and that such an announcement “shouldn’t be 
dumped on the Facebook developer blog at 9 p.m. on a Friday.”232  
The feature also troubled security experts like Graham Cluley, who 
lamented Facebook’s past failures in privacy security, its popularity 
as a target for data thieves, and ultimately suggested that users 
                                                 
 227. See Facebook Pushes Privacy Boundary; Users Push Back, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/facebook-pushes-privacy-boundary-users-
push-back-256191 (noting that, after receiving negative feedback forms, Facebook 
removed the feature). 
 228. Laurie Segall, Facebook Halts Phone Number Sharing Feature, CNN MONEY 
(Jan. 18, 2011, 10:33 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2011/01/18/ 
technology/facebook_privacy. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See David Goldman, Rapleaf Is Selling Your Identity, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2010, 
1:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/21/technology/rapleaf/index.htm. 
 232. Max Read, Third-Party Facebook Apps Could Have Access to Your Address and Phone 
Number, GIZMODO (Jan. 17, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5735382/third-
party-facebook-apps-could-have-access-to-your-address-and-phone-number. 
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should remove their addresses and phone numbers from the site.233  
Finally, personal responses made by Facebook users through the 
feedback forums were largely negative, and, in suspending the new 
feature, the company attributed this decision to “useful feedback” 
they had received.234 
Facebook has frequently been at the center of privacy policy 
controversies, some of which have been resolved through public 
backlash.235  In 2012, Facebook subsidiary Instagram updated its 
Terms of Service to allow private information to be shared with 
Facebook, other third parties, and most notably, “a business or other 
entity may pay us to display your username, likeness, [and] photos . . . 
without any compensation to you.”236  The New York Times publicized 
this change, stating, “[y]ou could star in an advertisement—without 
your knowledge”; further, it claimed that this policy possibly violated 
various state privacy laws.237  This publicity led to an immediate 
response.  National Geographic, a major Instagram user, threatened to 
stop using the service unless the terms were “clarified,” and 
numerous ordinary users threatened to quit the service.238  Instagram 
reversed the policy, which had not yet been implemented, within days 
of the initial New York Times article.239 
The Facebook experience is fostered by wide participation and 
users’ ability to use the site to disseminate information.240  The 
likelihood of one or two users noticing a term in a wrap contract or 
a change in terms is much more likely when drawing from a body of 
more than a billion users each month and over 757 million active 
Facebook users each day.241  Facebook also allows the posting of 
                                                 
 233. Graham Cluley, Rogue Facebook Apps Can Now Access Your Home Address and 
Mobile Phone Number, NAKED SEC. (Jan. 16, 2011), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/ 
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 234. Facebook Pushes Privacy Boundary, supra note 227. 
 235. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text. 
 236. Jenna Wortham & Nick Bilton, What Instagram’s New Terms of Service Mean for 
You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/ 
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(Feb. 4, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/ 
feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-statistics (observing that 757 million users log on to 
Facebook daily). 
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user content, in which Facebook contract terms can be criticized.  
Very few other online service and product providers are now subject 
to such scrutiny. 
A more recent example of consumer response to a much less 
frequently used webpage involved the General Mills webpage wrap.  
In 2013, consumers filed three cases against General Mills in 
California, alleging that General Mills misled customers by using the 
terms “Natural” and “100% Natural” on products containing 
unnatural ingredients.242  Shortly after failing to have these cases 
dismissed,243 General Mills took a step that appeared motivated by the 
realization of the risk of further litigation.  General Mills added a new 
Terms of Service to its website’s browsewrap.244  Most notably, the new 
Terms of Service included a forced arbitration clause which allowed 
the company to demand secret, non-appealable arbitration overseen 
by an arbitrator of the company’s choice.245  General Mills initially 
provided no notification for the change.246  After the New York Times 
contacted General Mills, it added a “thin, gray bar across the top of its 
home page.”247  It stated, “Please note we also have new legal terms 
which require all disputes related to the purchase or use of any General 
Mills product or service to be resolved through binding arbitration.”248 
In April 2014, the New York Times printed a story on the General 
Mills change.  The article reported that the policy precluded 
consumers from suing in court as soon as “they download coupons, 
‘join’ [General Mills] in online communities . . . , enter a company-
sponsored sweepstakes or contest or interact with [General Mills] in a 
variety of other ways.”249  According to the New York Times, the policy 
                                                 
 242. Bohac v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-05280, 2014 WL 1266848, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
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1248017, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 243. Bohac, 2014 WL 1266848, at *9; Janney, 2014 WL 1266299, at *8; Rojas, 2014 
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 248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 249. Id. 
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terms suggested that simple consumer actions, such as “liking” the 
company on Facebook would require consumers to be bound to the 
legal terms, including the requirement to arbitrate, no matter the 
nature of the dispute.250  The New York Times article also suggested 
that the terms may apply when consumers purchased General Mills 
products.251  While General Mills argued the terms “were widely 
misread,”252 the intent is difficult to discern when the vagueness of 
the terms leaves so much to judicial interpretation, particularly in 
light of the notice that suggests the arbitration clause would apply to 
a purchase or use of a product, without the need to browse the site.253 
The New York Times article was picked up by numerous publication 
services.254  The public responded with an onslaught of negative 
consumer attention on social media websites such as Twitter and 
Facebook.255  General Mills reversed the arbitration addition within 
days and reinstated the prior policy.256  In the explanation on its 
website, the company defended its now-rescinded legal terms as 
having been mischaracterized and simply an attempt to “streamline[] 
how complaints are handled,” further adding that “[m]any 
companies do the same [thing].”257  General Mills specifically 
identified the negative consumer response as the reason for reversing 
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TASTE OF GEN. MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/ 
weve-listened-and-were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were; see also 
Strom, supra note 244. 
 253. See Strom, supra note 244. 
 254. The article was picked up by publications including Consumer Action, 
Houston Chronicle, World News, and many others.  See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, When 
“Liking’ a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, CONSUMER ACTION (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/when_liking_a_brand_online_voids_ 
the_right_to_sue; Stephanie Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to 
Sue, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 16, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/article/When-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-5408669.php; Stephanie 
Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, WORLD NEWS (Apr. 21, 
2014), http://world-newstoday.com/when-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue. 
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the change, even while arguing that the new policy was not intended 
to treat consumers unfairly.258 
Of course, if the New York Times picks up a customer complaint, 
others who agree with the concerns will be motivated quickly.  The 
New York Times can characterize what is scary about the contract 
terms or changes and the reach of consequences from doing simple 
things seemingly unrelated to entering a contract.  The New York 
Times not only carries instant credibility, its writers know how to 
turn a phrase.  Some of the New York Times’ assertions about the 
General Mills terms of service may have been an overstatement, but 
the message was clear.  Unfortunately, most wrap abuses do not get 
coverage in the New York Times and this rare example cannot be a 
basis for ignoring other reforms. 
Notice to the user that terms exist is a start; notice about the 
content of the terms is better; however, the kinds of notice that 
academics propose will not translate into the necessary consumer 
action.  Disseminating sufficient information to raise consumers’ 
rightful ire generally will require the effort of experts to read, 
identify, and explain what the wrap contract purports to do in simple 
terms.  These reports would need to be readily accessible. 
One option would be a consumer news service or magazine that 
provides online reports of customer conflicts involving wrap 
contracts.  Most prospective consumers of an online service will not 
check there first, but some will.  The site could encourage those who 
share concerns to post information on their Facebook page or 
circulate it elsewhere.  Reports on wrap contracts could be organized 
by categories of companies (food, clothing, Internet access) or in 
alphabetical order and should be searchable.  Particularly useful in 
the short run would be a website that identified the top ten or twenty 
worse offenders.  Hopefully, this would have the salutary effect of not 
only causing the targeted companies to reverse their policies, but also 
informing other companies of the dangers of implementing such 
wrap contracts.  Of course, an information website will not be as 
effective as Facebook or the New York Times, but it offers an avenue 
for circulating information.  Even more effective would be a 
requirement that a website with a wrap provide the link to such a 
service on its home page or next to an “I accept” button. 
                                                 
 258. See id. (“Those terms—and our intentions—were widely misread, causing 
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CONCLUSION 
Wrap contract excesses have exceeded their usefulness.  It is time 
to reconsider their scope and enforceability under a variety of 
situations, especially those involving consumers and routine, small 
transactions.  It is time for courts to take the ethical charge of 
policing private contracting more seriously and for reinvigorating 
doctrines such as unconscionability.  It is time for economists to 
confront the concept of market regulations and the ability of 
consumers to shop around with more honest reality and less abstract 
theory.  It is time for large corporations and online service and 
product providers to self-impose meaningful notice requirements in 
standard adhesion contracts or cut back on their terms. 
In theory, notice to consumers does facilitate the free market 
concept that consumers are self-interested actors who will make 
choices that force the market to better serve their interests or go out 
of business.  However, this economic theory assumes access to 
information.  Notice is a vehicle for providing consumers with 
information, but notice is empty if it only leads to information that 
cannot be read within reasonable time constraints, is 
incomprehensible to almost all online consumers, is misjudged as to 
enforceability, and cannot be negotiated, especially if it is part of a 
product or service where the consumer has no viable alternatives.  
Notice might be the best answer, but only if it is comprehensible 
and time efficient. 
Existing notice proposals will not take a meaningful bite out of 
wrap contract abuses.  If providing notice is the best free market 
solution, the notice must be such that it conveys manageable 
information that can be absorbed and compared to the offerings of 
competitors with a reasonable amount of consumer time and effort.  
This Article proposes a contents box that distills the relevant 
information to a useable form.  In addition, notice may not be the 
answer in any form.  Better solutions may be the establishment of a 
best practices standard that allows consumers to quickly determine if 
the wrap contract on a website conforms to a balanced standard form 
or requires separate scrutiny.  In addition, wraps should be subject to 
some requirements of negotiability where the consumer has a 
meaningful choice of options.  The use of any of the proposals in this 
Article will make a significant contribution to educating consumers 
so they can unite and use their market pressure to insist on change. 
